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Abstract
This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is
match-specic. Job-seekers have private, noisy assessments of their match value and the rm
performs noisy interviews. Job-seekerswillingness to undergo a costly hiring process will depend
both on the wage paid and on the perceived likelihood of being hired, while a noisy interview
leads the rm to consider the quality of the applicant pool when setting hiring standards. I
characterize job-seekersequilibrium application decision as well as the rms equilibrium wage
and hiring rule. I show that changes in the informativeness of job-seekers assessments, or
changes in the informativeness of the rms interview, a¤ect the size and composition of the
applicant pool, and can raise hiring costs when it dissuades applications. As a result, the rm
may actually favor noisier interviews, or prefer to face applicants that are less certain of their
person-job/organization t.
Keywords: hiring, recruitment, selection, employer search.
JEL classications: D82, L23
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1 Introduction
Attracting and selecting the most suitable workers is arguably one of the main challenges that
organizations face.1 This challenge has become more prominent in recent times following a shift
towards knowledge-intensive and team-oriented work practices that place a stronger emphasis on
hiring the "right" worker for the organization.2 The main obstacle to e¢ cient matching comes from
information costs: rms and job-seekers need to devote time and resources to identify a potential
match and evaluate its surplus, prior to reaching an employment agreement (Pissarides, 2009).
To improve matching, employers engage in a variety of recruitment and selection activities, where
the former aim to create an applicant pool composed of the most promising prospects, and the
latter aim to identify those applicants that are the best t for the organization. For instance, a
rm may advertise the characteristics of its work-place, showcase their particular culture, or rely
on current employees to describe their work experience, in the hope of attracting workers that
thrive in such environment. Concurrently, rms can adopt new selection techniques to obtain more
precise estimates of applicantsexpected performance at the rm.3 This paper is concerned with
the equilibrium e¤ects of recruitment and selection activities on matching in the presence of t,
and a rms incentive to improve these activities.
Despite the vast literature on job-seekerssearch behavior, comparatively less is known of rm-
level hiring strategies (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011). There is, however, a large literature in the
Social Sciences - especically, in Industrial and Personnel Psychology- that reports substantial
heterogeneity in rm recruiting practices and a stark variation in their propensity to adopt di¤erent
selection methods both across rms and across jobs.4 For instance, the lack of adoption by rms
of "more informative" selection methods, like personality tests, has been especially noted in this
literature (see, Rynes et al. 2002, 2007), where this lack of adoption cannot be explained by
1While the practical importance of hiring is underscored by the amount of resources that rms allocate to it, there
is some evidence of its e¤ect on rm performance. For instance, the importance of hiring practices in workplaces
dominated by team structures can be traced back to Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997). See also Bloom and Van
Reenen (2010) for an analysis of HR practices in empirical studies of productivity e¤ects of management practices.
2The importance of person-organization or person-job t has been recently documented in the economic literature
(for an overview, see Oyer and Schaefer, 2011). For instance, Lazear (2003) argues that workers human capital is
general and multidimensional, but rms di¤er in the value they attach to each dimension. Hayes, Oyer and Schaefer
(2006) nd strong evidence of co-worker complementarity, supporting the claim that the "right" worker for a rm
may depend on the rms current workforce. Oyer and Schaefer (2012) and Lazear et al (forthcoming) provide further
evidence of match specic productivity derived from co-worker complementarity.
3Typical selection techniques involve direct evaluation of applicants through a series of interviews (structured or
unstructured), testing (e.g. psychometric, personality, intelligence), background and resume checks, "trial" periods
aimed at measuring on-the-job performance, or situational judgment tests (SJTs) that study the subjects reaction to
hypothetical business situations (see Gatewood, Feild and Barrick, 2010).
4The main ndings regarding heterogeneity in the adoption of specic selection methods come from Terpstra and
Rozell (1997), Van der Zee, Bakker and Bakker (2002) and Wilk and Capelli (2003).
1
implementation costs (Ones et al. 2007). One leading explanation is that applicantsperceptions
of the selection process dictate their willingness to be evaluated (Breaugh and Starke 2000, Ryan and
Ployhart 2000), and these new selection methods may have an adverse e¤ect on such perceptions.5
The aim of this paper is to clarify how the information available to each side of the market
a¤ects rmshiring costs and the protability of di¤erent recruitment and selection activities.6 As
in the literature reviewed in Breaugh and Starke (2000) and Ryan and Ployhart (2000), the start-
ing observation is that a job-seekers perception of both her match value and of the hiring process
dictates her willingness to apply to the rm. I develop a model in which an applicants private
estimate of match value translates through the intensity of a rms screening to a likelihood of
receiving an employment o¤er.7 This generates an interdependence between recruitment and selec-
tion: how a rm screens applicants a¤ects their willingness to be recruited, while the composition
of a self-selected applicant pool provides a rm with additional information when making hiring
choices. As a result, to evaluate improvements in one area, say selection, a rm needs to consider
also their e¤ect on other areas, in this case on its ability to attract job-seekers.
I consider situations were the posted wage is a workers sole employment benet, so that a
job-seekers willingness to incur the application cost will vary with the announced wage premium.
This also means that hiring costs increase whenever the rm expands its applicant pool by o¤ering
a higher wage premium. Therefore, changes in the information available to each side of the market
that dissuade applications indirectly increase hiring costs, as the rm would then need to raise the
wage to attract the same applicant pool. That is, when evaluating improvements in recruitment
and selection, a rm must not only contrast the benet of improved information to the direct cost
of resources, but also to the indirect cost associated with changes in the applicant pool. I show, for
example, that rms may fail to adopt seemingly inexpensive screening tests for fear of dissuading
applicants, and may avoid informative advertising of rm/job characteristics when applicants are
poorly informed of match value. In all these cases, improving either job-seekers or the rms
5Alternative explanations o¤ered in the literature are: (i) poor predictive power and low validity of new screening
tests, in particular, personality tests (Morgeson et al 2007), (ii) a gap between theory and practice were practitioners
fail to acknowledge and exploit the evidence in favor of these new screening tests (Rynes et al 2002, 2007), and (iii)
legal impediments to the deployment of personality tests as they may result in adverse impact (although, see Autor
and Scarborough 2008 for a study of testing on minority hiring).
6The terms "recruitment" and "selection" in this follow their usage in the Human Resource and Industrial Psy-
chology literature. Following Barber (1998, pp 5-6), "recruitment includes those practices and activities carried on by
the organization with the primary purpose of identifying and attracting potential employees". Selection is typically
dened as the practices aimed at separating from a pool of applicants those who have the appropriate knowledge,
skills and abilities to perform well on the job (Gatewood et al 2010).
7The fact that recruitment outcomes are driven by applicants estimate of their likelihood of gaining employment
can be traced back in the Psychology Literature to expectancy theory as applied to HR (see Vroom 1964, Wanous
1980, and Barber and Roehling 1993).
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information can have subtle equilibrium e¤ects on the size and composition of the applicant pool.
For instance, a more discriminating interview may actually encourage more applications and reduce
hiring costs.
To explore this interdependence between recruitment and selection, I study a hiring model
with the following ingredients: (i) Match specicity: job-seekers di¤er in their productivity when
employed by di¤erent rms. To simplify the analysis, I assume that there is one rm for which
each job-seekers productivity is initially unknown, while all job-seekers have the same productivity
when matched with a group of alternative rms.8 (ii) Bilateral asymmetric information: prior to
applying, each job-seeker obtains a noisy, private signal of her productivity when matched with
the rm (her "type"), while the rm can subject her to an "interview" that produces a noisy
signal of match value. (iii) Costly Search: both applicants and the rm need to devote resources
during the hiring process. Applicantscosts are borne at the time of application, while the rm
incurs its costs when it interviews applicants. (iv) Incomplete Contracting: The rm can neither
condition payments on the results of the interview nor on whether the job-seeker actually incurred
the application costs, but can commit to a "posted-wage" paid to every hired applicant. Finally, in
the base model I assume that generating a vacancy is costless, so the rm will hire any applicant
whose expected productivity exceeds the posted wage.
Underlying the equilibrium is a simultaneous Bayesian inference problem that both job-seekers
and the rm must solve: prior to applying, each job-seeker needs to predict her hiring probability
given her type and the rms hiring rule, while an imperfect interview leads the rm to also consider
the self-selected applicant pool when setting a hiring rule.9 Therefore, application decisions and
the hiring rule are both determined in an equilibrium which exhibits positive assortative matching:
all job-seekers with an estimate of match value above a threshold apply to the rm, but only high
interview performers are hired (Proposition 1).
Matching frictions in this setup stem from incomplete contracting. Indeed, the e¤ect of appli-
cants perceptions on the e¢ ciency of matching would disappear if application costs are contractible,
as the rm would then compensate the applicant for her costs and o¤er a wage that matches her
outside option, in which case the hiring outcome is constrained e¢ cient (Proposition 2). Thus the
8 I do not restrict the sources of match specicity, which can arise both from the characteristics of co-workers and
the attributes of the rm/job that jointly shape the productivity of the worker in that rm. While one could further
di¤erentiate between worker-rm productivity and worker-job productivity (as in Kristof-Brown et al 2005), I will
not explore this distinction here.
9Stanton and Thomas (2014) nd evidence that the characteristics of the applicant pool a¤ect rms search
intensity and hiring strategies, while Burks et al (2013) nd that workers hired through referrals have di¤erent
characteristics than non-referred workers, consistent with the notion that referrals a¤ect the information available to
job-seekers about match value.
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need to attract applications leads the rm to consider the quality of the applicant pool when setting
the wage (Proposition 3).
I assume that the e¤ect of improving the hiring process is mainly informational: improved
screening leads to a more informative interview, while improving recruitment leads job-seekersto
have a less noisy estimate of match value. As application and hiring decisions are jointly determined,
improving screening or recruitment has subtle e¤ects on the composition of the applicant pool. For
instance, a more discriminating interview discourages applications when the average quality of the
applicant pool is either high or low, but can encourage more applications for a mediocre applicant
pool (Proposition 4). In contrast, better informed job-seekers are more likely to apply when the
quality of the applicant pool is high, but are dissuaded if the quality of the applicant pool is low
(Proposition 5).
When faced with an opportunity to improve the hiring process, the rm must consider both the
direct e¤ect of more informative signals and the indirect e¤ect of a change in the size and quality
of the applicant pool. For instance, while a more informative interview always reduces hiring
mistakes, it can also discourage job-seekers from applying. This reduces the incentives to improve
screening, especially when the interview is already fairly informative. Indeed, when the quality of
the applicant pool is either high or low, the rm never adopts a perfectly informative interview,
even if it is costless (Proposition 6). Moreover, better informed job-seekers also face less uncertainty
over their interview score. This may prove costly for the rm, however, if it reduces the applicant
pool. Perhaps surprisingly, the rm always avoids informative advertising when job-seekers are
poorly informed of match quality (Proposition 7).
I show in Section 7 that these results are robust to variations in the characteristics of the hiring
process. If the rm faces a slot constraint, then informational improvements that dissuade applica-
tions do not change the level of employment but force the rm to hire lower quality applicants. The
incentives to invest in screening workers are lower if there is on-the-job learning and easy separation
for bad matches, however, the rm may also avoid advertising in this case.
This paper is primarily related to the literature on hiring practices in rms. This literature
has studied several methods for rms to induce self-selection among privately informed applicants.
For instance, the design of pay-for performance schemes can be used to identify those workers that
are most productive (Lazear 2001, Oyer and Schaefer 2005), more motivated (Delfgaauw and Dur
2007), more likely to stay with the rm (Salop and Salop 1976) or that share the vision and values
of the rm (Van den Steen 2005). I concentrate, however, on direct methods of screening: a rm
selects workers by subjecting them to an evaluation process.
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Several papers in the labor literature have considered rmsevaluation of applicants in explain-
ing hiring outcomes. Pries and Rogerson (2005) develop a matching model with both screening and
on-the-job learning, and study the impact of di¤erent labor policies on the rms hiring standard.
Unlike this model, however, the rm does not need to recruit workers as matches are exogenously
formed according to a xed matching function. The role of applicants perceptions of the hiring
process is a central theme in Chade, Lewis and Smith (2014), who consider college admissions with
heterogenous students where students can apply to at most two colleges at a cost. While colleges
perform an imperfect interview, students are perfectly aware of their caliber. This precludes the
study of recruitment strategies that raise students knowledge of their caliber.10
Woltho¤ (2012) proposes a search model where job-seekers can apply to multiple rms while a
rm can interview multiple applicants. Costly applications and costly interviews lead to matching
frictions. Unlike our model, all job-seekers are ex ante homogenous and face the same probability
of being hired by a given rm while every rms interview perfectly identies match quality.11
Finally, De Varo (2008) studies the role of recruiment choices on a rms hiring outcome, where
the rm can increase its applicant pool by increasing the wage premium, and can increase the
quality of the applicant pool by employing informal recruitment methods (e.g., word-of-mouth
referrals). However, the application decisions of job-seekers are taken as exogenous, implying that
their perceptions of the hiring process do not a¤ect the rms recruiting strategies.12
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the model. Sections
3 and 4 analyze the equilibrium application and hiring decisions, as well as the equilibrium wage.
Section 5 provides the main comparative statics on the applicant pool and Section 6 discusses the
rms incentives to improve recruitment and selection. Section 7 considers several extensions of the
basic analysis, and I conclude in Section 8. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Players: There is a continuum of job-seekers of unit mass. Job-seekers are risk neutral, protected
by limited liability, and can seek employment in rm A or in any rm of a group of alternative,
identical rms. Firm A (henceforth "the rm") can create a continuum of vacancies of mass one at
no cost. I relax this assumption in Section 7 by allowing for slot constraints, so that the rm can
10Nagypal (2004) also considers the college application decision but assumes that students are imperfectly informed
of their caliber. However, as the college interview is perfect, the model cannot study the e¤ect of more informative
screening on applicants behavior.
11Woltho¤ (2012) considers also the possibility of ex ante heterogeneity among workers in a dynamic extension to
the basic model. However, workers productivity is assumed to be publicly known.
12See also DeVaro (2005) for empirical evidence of the e¤ect of recruitment choices on hiring outcomes.
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hire at most a mass K of workers. A job-seeker has known productivity w2 R when employed by an
outside rm, while her productivity  when employed at the rm is a random variable that is i.i.d.
across job-seekers and normally distributed,   N(0; 1=h0). Competition for workers implies that
a job-seeker can nd employment at any time in any of those rms at a wage w.13 The sources of
match-specicity can range from the existence of worker-rm production complementarities (Hayes,
Oyer and Schaefer 2006), heterogeneity in rm valuations of worker attributes (Lazear 2009), or
even di¤erences in beliefs and preferences of workers (Van den Steen 2005) (see Oyer and Schaefer
2011 for a general discussion). In this paper I focus on the e¤ect on hiring outcomes of variability
in match productivity across applicants for a single rm. This assumption leads to a tractable
characterization of equilibrium, and allows a clear characterization of the returns to recruitment
and screening.Alternatively, each workers set of skill, knowledge and abilities may be similarly
valued by di¤erent rms. In this case, the productivity when employed by the rm and a workers
outside option will be correlated, inducing the standard adverse selection e¤ect under asymmetric
information.14
Hiring Process: The hiring process is divided into three stages: application, evaluation, and
hiring decision. At the application stage, job-seekers decide whether to apply to the rm. Any
job-seeker that applies to the rm incurs a private cost cA. Thus, if  were commonly observed by
all market participants,  w cA is the surplus generated by a -worker when employed at the rm
and e¢ cient matching would have job-seekers with  w+cA matching with the rm. Conversely, if
parties cannot obtain any information regarding , then all job-seekers should match with the rm
if w+cA < 0(= E[]); while all job-seekers would match with outside rms if w+cA > 0. Prior to
submitting her application, a job-seeker receives a private signal sA that is informative of , where
sA= is normally distributed, sA=  N(; 1=hA); with hA the precision of a job-seekers private
assessment of .15
The evaluation stage ("interview") can be thought of as a statistical experiment in which the
rm obtains information about an applicants  through a series of tests. Interviews are costly for
the rm since evaluating a measure m of applicants imposes a cost cFm 16. The result of each
interview is summarized by a signal sF , which is privately observed by the rm, and is correlated
13Also, the value of leisure is strictly lower than w for all job-seekers so that they all strictly prefer employment.
This simplication is without loss of generality as the role of the group of alternative rms is to provide a homogeneous
outside option to all applicants to rm A.
14The e¤ect of correlation in the job-seekers productivity across rms is explored in Alonso (2014a).
15 In some cases, job-seekers assessment of her suitability for a job is fully embodied in certiable credentials. In
reality, however, the beliefs and views of applicants about their match productivity cannot be described in a veriable
fashion, that is, as in our case, they are "soft" information. In general, "high bandwidth" information that is di¢ cult
to describe and encode is typically privately known by applicants (Autor 2001).
16Our main focus will be on cF = 0: I consider the impact of positive evaluation costs by the rm in Section 7.
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with  according to sF =  N(; 1=hF ). Thus hF is the precision with which the rm can evaluate
an applicants match-specic productivity.
An important aspect of the model is that both applicants and the rm nd it costly to generate
a productive match. We follow Pissarides (2009) in arguing that these matching costs derive both
from the value of the foregone opportunities and from the resources devoted to discover match
quality. Importantly, while the rm devotes resources to evaluate, train or bargain with applicants,
applicants also need to invest time and resources to train for the rms selection process, comply
with the requisite credentials, cover the administrative application costs, and ultimately engage
actively in the interview process.17 To simplify the exposition, I consider all these costs to be
homogenous across job-seekers and equal to cA.18
This model of the hiring process shares several similarities with the literature on employer search
where employers have two dimensions on which to scale their search e¤orts (see e.g., Rees 1966 and
Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg 1985 ): employers can decide the number of applicants to evaluate
(extensive margin) and the extent to which each applicant is evaluated (intensive margin). In this
paper, the extensive margin is the measure of applicants evaluated, and depends on cF , while the
intensive margin is given by the precision of the rms assessment hF . In the analysis, however, the
rm is endowed with an evaluation technology characterized by (cF ; cA; hF ). Therefore only the
extensive margin is determined in equilibrium, while some of the results concern the rms marginal
returns to increasing the intensive margin.
Informational content of private signals: It will prove convenient to normalize the signals sA
and sF in terms of the posterior means that they induce. Thus let vi be
vi = E[jsi] = hi
h0 + hi
si;
with ex-ante distribution vi  N
 
0; 2vi

; where 2vi =
hi
h0(h0+hi)
; i 2 fA;Fg. We will refer to vA as
the applicants "type" and vF as the interview "score".
This specication has two advantages. First, changes in hi; i 2 fA;Fg; have no e¤ect on how a
given vi is interpreted as a predictor of  since E[jvi] = vi. If the rm had no additional information,
hiring decisions will depend solely on vF , regardless of the interviews precision. Second, increases
17Applicants evaluation costs during the interview phase range from psychic costs associated with intense scrutiny
to the opportunity cost of time or e¤ort costs necessary to perform during the interview (for instance when the
"interview" is a probationary period).
18This assumption simplies the inference problem of the rm and allows a simple characterization of the equilibrium
bayesian inference problem. Alonso (2014b) considers a model where applicants face di¤erent (private) application
costs, but her signal sA is embodied in her credentials and thus certiable. Even if the rm could pay each job-seeker
an "application fee", similar results would obtain in terms of the returns to improved recruitment and selection as in
this paper.
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in the precisions hi, i 2 fA;Fg; lead to a higher variance of the signals vi, i 2 fA;Fg, which
is consistent with the fact that more informative signals lead to a higher dispersion of posterior
expectations.19
A key feature of the model is that the private evaluations vA and vF are correlated, thus
allowing for both the estimation of the applicants type from the interview score and the applicants
prediction of the interview score given her type. As the (linear) correlation coe¢ cient  between
vA and vF is
2 =
hF
h0 + hF
hA
h0 + hA
; (1)
we have the following mean and variance when estimating vi from vj , i; j 2 fA;Fg; i 6= j;
E[vijvj ] = hi
h0 + hi
vj ; (2)
2vijvj  V ar[vijvj ] = (1  2)2vi =

hi
h0 + hi
2 1
h0 + hj
+
1
hi

: (3)
Contracts: We take an incomplete contracting view of the hiring process in that the rm can only
commit to payments based on whether the applicant is hired. Implicit is the assumption that both
the applicants type and the interview score are privately observed (i.e., they are "soft" information)
and contracts cannot be written directly on these values. This implies, for instance, that the rm
cannot contractually commit to base hiring decisions on the interview score in arbitrary ways.
Also, I assume that the rm cannot condition payments on whether the applicant has incurred the
necessary application costs and is ready to be evaluated. Informally, if the rm pays each individual
for simply "showing up", all individuals would apply to the rm, while some of them will not incur
the application costs as they immediately apply elsewhere.
As job-applicants cannot be directly compensated for their costs, the rm would need to make
employment su¢ ciently desirable in order to attract applications. To do so, I assume that the rm
can ex-ante commit to a "posted-wage" schedule (wE ; tE) , where wE is the wage to be paid to a
hired applicant, and tE is a transfer paid to each applicant regardless of whether she is ultimately
hired. Our limited liability assumption translates in this case to tE  0: The rm could in principle
attempt to induce an applicant to reveal her type by o¤ering di¤erent employment contracts. I
show in Section 7 that applicants limited liability implies that the rm does not nd it protable
to o¤er a menu of employment contracts.
Timing and Equilibrium: The model is static and considers matching in a single period. The
rm is endowed with an evaluation technology (cF ; cA; hF ) and posts a wage schedule (wE ; tE).
19For instance, Ganuza and Penalva (2010) derive a series of informational orders based on the dispersion of
conditional expectations, where, for the class of decision problems considered, a more informative signal induces a
higher dispersion in posterior expectations.
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Job-seekers learn their type vA and, after observing (wE ; tE), decide to apply to the rm. Given
the mass of applicants, the rm decides whether to submit each applicant to an interview, and
whether to extend an employment o¤er, paying wE + tE to a hired applicant and tE if it does
not extend an employment o¤er. Independent of whether they are evaluated or not, applicants
that do not receive an employment o¤er, or reject an employment o¤er, can instantaneously nd
employment at any of the identical rms that pay w. Finally, payo¤s are realized and the game
ends.
The notion of equilibrium is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Given our assumptions on job-seekers
we can directly establish that in equilibrium tE = 0. Indeed, as any applicant can guarantee herself
at least a payo¤ of tE+w if evaluated by applying without incurring the application costs, if tE > 0
all job-seekers would strictly prefer to apply to the rm, even if they believe to be a poor match.
Therefore, equilibrium contracts are determined by the posted wage wE .
3 Equilibrium Hiring and Application Decisions
We start the analysis by characterizing the application and hiring choices in a subgame where the
rm posts wage wE . For simplicity, our results in Sections 3-6 are derived for the case where the
rm incurs no costs of evaluation, i.e., cF = 0. We complete our analysis by considering a positive
interview cost in Section 7.
We solve for an equilibrium by backward induction. We rst derive the rms sequentially
rational hiring rule after evaluating an applicant. The rm optimally sets a "hiring standard", that
depends on the composition of the applicant pool, and hires any applicant whose interview score
exceeds it. Anticipating the rms hiring standard and interview decision, we then determine a
job-seekers application decision as a function of her type.
3.1 Firms Hiring Decision
Suppose that all job-seekers with types vA in the set A apply to the rm.20 As vA is correlated
with , after the interview the rm has two informative signals of match-specic productivity: the
interview score vF , and the fact that the job-seeker chose to apply to the rm, vA 2 A: The rms
inability to contractually condition hiring outcomes on vF implies that in any sequentially rational
hiring rule the rm o¤ers employment only if an applicants expected productivity, as given by
E [jvF ; vA 2 A], does not fall short of the cost of hiring, as giving by the wage wE . The following
20We need not worry about mixing by job-seekers as, given our assumptions on the signal structure and optimal
behavior by the rm, job-seekers have a strict preference on applications with probability 1.
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lemma shows that this leads the rm to optimally adopt a threshold hiring rule.
Lemma 1. For each measurable set A there exists vF (A) such that the rm extends an employment
o¤er after interviewing an applicant of type vA 2 A if and only if vF vF (A). The hiring standard
vF (A) satises
E [jvF (A); vA 2 A] = wE : (4)
To understand the rms updating in our setup with joint normality of match value and signals,
suppose rst that the applicants type could be credibly disclosed (i.e., vA is "hard" information).
Then the rm would simply weigh each signal to obtain
E[jvF ; vA] = h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vA: (5)
When the applicants type is "soft", however, the rm faces a ltering problem as the interview
score vF can be used to rene the estimate of the applicants actual type vA given the "application
signal" fvA 2 Ag. Therefore, the rms estimate of match value becomes
E[jvF ; vA 2 A] = h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
E[vAjvF ; vA 2 A]: (6)
That hiring decisions satisfy a cut-o¤ rule then follows from the observation that as vF and
vA satisfy the MLRP with  they also satisfy the same property among them (Karlin and Rubin,
1956). Therefore, the ltering term E[vAjvF ; vA 2 A] is non-decreasing in the interview score for
any set A -a better score leads to a more optimistic revision of the applicants type-. As a result,
E[jvF ; vA 2 A] strictly increases in vF both because a higher interview score implies a higher
expected match value and a higher interview score identies a higher applicant type. Finally,
the existence of a "hiring standard" vF (A) satisfying (4) is ensured by the unbounded support of
E [jvF ; vA 2 A] for xed A.
3.2 Job-seekers Application Decision
Given the rms hiring standard (4), which job-seekers would be willing to apply if the rm inter-
views all applicants? As vF and vA are correlated, each job-seeker faces a prediction problem: To
estimate the likelihood of meeting the rms hiring criteria given her type. In general, arbitrary hir-
ing rules may deter applications from job-seekers with a high estimate of ; but attract job-seekers
with lower estimates. Since the rms equilibrium hiring decision follows a cut-o¤ rule, however, a
job-seekers application decision will also be monotone in her type.
Lemma 2. Suppose that wE > w+cA and the rm evaluates all applicants. Then, for any threshold
hiring standard vF there exists a marginal type vA(vF ) such that a job-seeker of type vA applies to
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the rm i¤ vA  vA(vF ); where vA(vF ) is the unique solution to
(wE   w) Pr [vF  vF jvA(vF )] = cA: (7)
Recall that in our setup any rejected applicant can immediately secure employment elsewhere at
a wage w. The left hand side of (7) thus captures the expected incremental benet for a type-vA
job-seeker of gaining employment at the rm. To evaluate this benet, an applicant needs to predict
the likelihood of meeting the hiring standard after being interviewed; i.e., estimate Pr [vF  vF jvA].
As vF and vA satisfy the MLRP, then Pr [vF  vF jvA] is increasing in the applicants type and,
as all applicants incur the same application cost, the expected gain from applying to the rm also
increases in vA. Therefore, the rms threshold hiring rule induces a monotone application rule:
All types vA > vA(vF ) apply to the rm, where the marginal type vA(vF ) satises (7) and obtains
no expected rent from applying.
3.3 Equilibrium Application and Evaluation
Contractual incompleteness of the hiring process constraints the rms behavior in two ways. First,
as explained in Lemma 1, the rm cannot commit to arbitrary hiring rules; cf. Lemma 1. As
a result, all interviewed applicants face a positive probability of being rejected. Second, non-
contractibility of the interview itself implies that: (i) the rm cannot commit to skip the interview
for some applicants, and (ii) the rm cannot pay a di¤erent wage to an applicant hired without
an interview. As every worker receives the same wage and the interview is costless for the rm,
then the rm will interview all applicants. There are situations, however, where the rm would
benet from not interviewing applicants. For instance, if job-seekers have very precise estimates
of match value (high hA) and the rms interview is very noisy (low hF ), the rm could post a
wage wE = w+ cA and hire all applicants without interview. As job-seekers are indi¤erent between
applying to the rm or elsewhere, an equilibrium exists in which types vA  wE apply and are hired
without an interview. I explore this possibility in Section 7 when I consider the case of positive
interview costs cF > 0.
As the rm interviews all applicants, only those job-seekers that are su¢ ciently condent of
meeting the rms equilibrum hiring standard will incur the application cost cA. To describe the
equilibrium I introduce the following "reaction" functions for job-seekers and the rm. First, dene
bA(vA; p) as
bA(vA; p) = max fvF : Pr [vF  vF jvA]  pg (8)
= E[vF jvA] + vF jvA 1 (p) ;
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that is bA(vA; p) is the maximum hiring standard that a type-vA job-seeker would pass with proba-
bility at least p. Second, dene bF (vA; w) as the rms optimal hiring standard when the applicant
pool is fv0A : v0A  vAg and the wage is w, that is
E [jbF (vA; w); vA  vA] = w: (9)
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Hiring and Applications). For each wE > w + cA; the unique
sequentially rational continuation equilibrium is described by a type vA such that all types vA  vA
apply to the rm while types vA < vA gain employment elsewhere at wage w: The rm evaluates all
applicants and hires an applicant i¤ vF  vF . The marginal applicant vA and the hiring standard
vF are the unique solution to
vF = bF (vA; wE); (10)
vF = bA(vA;
cA
wE   w ): (11)
Figure 1 depicts the equlibirum dened by (10-11). In this setup, match specicity leads to
positive assortative matching: for any posted wage wE > w+ cA, all job-seekers that believe to be
a good match apply to the rm (vA vA), and the top interview performers are hired (vF vF ),
where vA and vF are the unique solution to the simultaneous Bayesian inference problem (10-
11). Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium hiring standard and application decision of Proposition 1.
The equilibrium (10-11) is given by the unique intersection of the functions bA(vA;
cA
wE w ) and
bF (vA; wE): Figure 1 also depicts the optimal hiring rule if the applicants type is certiable. As
it is intuitive, unobservability of vA raises the probability that lower types are hired but reduces
that of higher types. Finally, uniqueness of equilibrium follows from the fact that the rms hiring
standard is decreasing in the quality of the applicant pool (and hence decreasing in vA), while the
maximum hiring standard that a job-seeker is willing to beat increases in his type.
We now describe in more detail this inference problem by looking separately at the rms
ltering and applicants prediction problems. We di¤er the analysis of comparative statics wrt the
precision of signals to Section 5.
Filtering Problem. In our jointly normal framework we have vAjvF  N

E[vAjvF ]; 2vAjvF

;
where E[vAjvF ] and 2vAjvF are given by (2). Therefore, an applicant randomly drawn from a pool
fvA : vA  vAg whose test result is vF is expected to be of type
E[vAjvF ; vA  vA] =
hA
h0 + hA
vF + vAjvF 

vA   E[vAjvF ]
vAjvF

;
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Hiring and Applications for wage wE .
where  is the hazard rate of a standard Normal.21 Combining this expression with (6), the rms
ex-post evaluation is
E[jvF ; vA  vA] = vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vAjvF 

vA   E[vAjvF ]
vAjvF

: (12)
That is, the rm will correct its initial assessment of the candidate, as given by vF , by an amount
that depends on the di¤erence between the marginal applicant and the rms expectation of the
applicants type given vF .
It is instructive to compare (12) to the case when the applicants type is observable by the
rm, as given by (5). In this case the sensitivity of the rms posterior expectation with respect
to vF is independent of the type of applicant. This is no longer true when vA is unobservable as
the rm tries to infer vA from vF . In fact, twice di¤erentiating (12) establishes that both pieces of
information act as substitutes, in the sense that
@2E[jvF ; vA  vA]
@vF@vA
 0:
Thus the rms posterior expectation becomes less responsive to the interview score as the applicant
pool becomes more selective. The intuition for this result is that a more selective applicant pool
21This expression follows from the fact that for a normal distribution of mean  and variance  the truncated
expectation is E [xjx  a] = + h  a 


.
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(higher vA) is also a "more informative" applicant pool as the rm faces less uncertainty regarding
the type of a randomly chosen applicant.22 Thus, the rm puts more weight on the update term
in (12) as vA increases. In fact, if the applicant pool becomes very selective, so that vA tends to
1, then (12) converges to
E[jvF ; vA  vA] 
h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vA:
That is, the rm updates as if it faces no uncertainty about the applicants type (which approx-
imately equals the type of the marginal applicant). In summary, we can write (10) as
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vAjvF 

vA   E[vAjvF ]
vAjvF

= wE : (13)
Prediction Problem. We now turn to the applicants prediction problem. Conditional on vA, the
interview score vF is normally distributed; with E[vAjvF ] and 2vAjvF given by (2). Therefore (10)
translates to
vF   E[vF jvA] =  vF jvA 1(
cA
wE   w ): (14)
That is, the di¤erence between the rms hiring standard and the expected score of the marginal
applicant is proportional to the variance the applicant faces over the interview score. This is
intuitive: if cA= (wE   w) < 1=2, so the marginal applicant is more likely to fail the interview than to
pass it, a "less predictable" interview (i.e., one with a higher perceived variance) increases the option
value of applying and would attract a lower type, all else equal. Conversely, if cA= (wE   w) < 1=2,
so that the marginal applicant is more likely to pass the test, a more uncertain interview would
increase vA and thus result in less applications.
4 The Wage as a Recruitment and Selection Tool
The rms recruitment e¤orts can be based on three dimensions: (i) more intense advertising of its
vacancies, (ii) more informative advertising of job/rm characteristics, and (iii) increasing the jobs
appeal to prospective applicants. In our model, job appeal is embodied by the posted wage wE .
We now characterize the equilibrium wage wE given the hiring and application decisions described
in Proposition 1. To better understand the role of non-contractible application costs, we rst study
a benchmark case in which these costs can be contractually covered by the rm.
22This result is immediate in our case as a normal distribution has an increasing and unbounded hazard rate. This
implies that a randomly chosen applicant from a pool fvA  vAg is increasingly likely to be close to the marginal type
vA as vA increases. This result would remain true if the underlying distribution has an increasing and unbounded
hazard rate.
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4.1 Benchmark: Contractible Applicant Costs
Suppose that the rm can condition payments on whether the applicant incurred the application
costs. The rm then o¤ers a contract (c; wC) to each applicant, which pays c if the applicant incurred
the costs cA, and, additionally, a wage wC if the candidate is hired. The following proposition
describes the equilibrium in this case.
Proposition 2 (Contractible Application Costs) There exists a unique PBE of the game in
which application costs are contractible: the rm o¤ers a contract (c; wC) = (cA; w); all job-seekers
of type vA  vCA apply to the rm, and only those with interview scores vF  vCF are hired. The
marginal type vCA and the hiring standard v
C
F solve
E[   wjvCA; vF  vCF ] Pr

vF  vCF jvCA

= cA; (15)
E[jvCF ; vA  vCA] = w: (16)
If application costs are contractible, the rm will optimally cover them and pay a wage that
matches the applicants outside option w. That is, match specicity will not translate into wage
dispersion if the rm can directly cover the application costs. To see that the contract (cA; w) is
optimal, note that all applicants obtain no rents from applying to the rm. The marginal applicant
vCA and hiring standard v
C
F are then given by the joint solution to (15) and (16). First, (15) implies
that the rm obtains a zero prot if it decided to evaluate the marginal applicant. This condition
is necessary for an equilibrium - if expected prot exceeds application costs the rm can raise
the wage in order to attract more applicants, while if expected prot falls below the application
costs the rm can lower its application subsidy (and increase the wage) to dissuade applications-.
Second, (16) is the sequentially rational hiring standard where the rm makes a zero prot on the
marginal hire. Importantly, there is no ex-post distortion in the hiring decision given the available
information to the rm: the rm hires the applicant as long as the expected match value exceeds
the applicants outside option.23
23Unlike in Proposition 3 below, in the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 all applicants are indi¤erent between
applying and being hired by the rm at wage w or securing their outside option. One then would argue that the
absence of incentive conicts could lead applicants to truthfully disclose vA. That is indeed the case: there is an
equilibrium with costless communication in which the applicant truthfully reports her type to the rm. Moreover,
there is no ine¢ ciency in matching as hiring decisions are ex-post optimal and make use of all available information.
Therefore, non-contractibility of application costs also implies that information is lost as it cannot be credibly disclosed
by the applicant to the rm.
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4.2 Limits to the wage as a recruitment tool.
When application costs are not contractible the wage plays a dual incentive-sorting role: it motivates
job-seekers to incur the applications costs, and attracts only those applicants condent of being
a good match. The rst role implies that low wages wE < w + cA are ine¤ectual in recruiting
applicants. However, the rms inability to commit to arbitrary hiring rules limits the e¢ cacy of
the wage in its second role. Indeed, Lemma 3 shows that high wages are undesirable as increasing
them may actually dissuade applications.
Lemma 3. Let vA (wE) be dened by (10-11), and let wmax be the unique solution to
dvA=dwE jwE=wmax = 0:
Then the equilibrium posted wage wE satises
w + cA < wE < wmax:
Increasing wE has two countervailing e¤ects on an applicants behavior. To be sure, a higher wage
makes employment more desirable. A higher wage, however, increases the rms hiring cost, thus
leading to a higher hiring standard and raising the probability that the marginal applicant fails
the interview. The proof of Lemma 3 shows that the rst e¤ect dominates for low wages, while
the second e¤ect dominates for high wages. In other words, increasing the wage wE above wmax
actually increases the marginal type vA; and thus reduces the number of applications. This implies
that there is a lower wage that attracts the same applicant pool at a lower cost, and thus wages
above wmax are dominated and would never be posted in equilibrium.24
4.3 Equilibrium Wage
Facing a continuum of job-seekers, the rms expected prot is the product of the total mass of
hired applicants and the expected match surplus of a hired applicant. If all applicants are evaluated,
this is formally equivalent to
 = (1  F (vA; vF ))E[   wE jvF  vF ; vF  vA] =
Z 1
 1
Z 1
vF
Z 1
vA
(   wE) dF (; vA; vF )
=
Z 1
 1
(   wE)  [zA(; vA)]  [zF (; vF )] dF (); (17)
with  the cdf of a standard normal distribution, and
zi(; vi) =
p
hi [   vi (hi + h0) =hi] ; i = A;F: (18)
24To be precise, this is true as vA (wE) is continuous and unbounded as wE ! w; for any wage above wE > wmaxE .
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We can interpret (17) as the payo¤ from a decentralized sequential testing process (Wald, 1945)
where the rm obtains the benet    wE from a candidate of value  only under a "double
detection": if the candidate applies (which occurs with probability  [zA(; vA)]), and is hired
(which, independently of the application decision, would occur with probability  [zF (; vF )]).
25
The rm behaves as a standard monopsonist over match specic value when setting the wage:
by raising the wage it attracts more applicants but raises the wage bill per employee. The following
proposition describes the properties of the optimal posted wage.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Posted Wage) If the rm faces no direct costs of evaluating applicants
then the optimal wage wE satises
Pr [vF  vF ; vA  vA]
Pr [vF  vF ; vA]
= E[   wE jvF  vF ; vA]

  dvA
dwE

wE=w

E
: (19)
In particular,
(i) The wage wE and Pr [vF  vF jvA] are non-decreasing in cA:
(ii) Let v0A be such that
E[   wjvF  vF ; v0A] = 0 (20)
E[   wjvA  v0A; vF ] = 0 (21)
Then
lim
cA!0
vA = v
0
A:
The optimality condition (19) follows from applying the envelope theorem given the rms se-
quentially rational hiring rule. The rm will never set a wage such that the marginal appli-
cant, conditional on being hired, is a bad match. Indeed, from (19) it readily follows that
E[   wE jvF  vF ; vA] > 0. Also, by comparing (19) to the case of contractible costs (15) it
is clear that non-contractibility of costs leads to too few applicants apply to the rm.
Proposition 3-i shows that higher application costs lead to a larger wage premium but also a more
selective applicant pool. This last point is a consequence of the ratio cA=(w w) being monotone
in cA, which also implies that the probability that the marginal applicant is hired increases in cA.
Thus the marginal applicant is more condent of passing the test for higher costs which implies an
increase in vA.
Proposition 3-ii shows that vanishing evaluation costs would not lead the rm to attract and
evaluate all job-seekers. In particular, the rm does not attract any job-seeker with vA < v0A when
25See De Groot (1970, Chapter 12-14) for a discussion of sequential testing processes.
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cA > 0. Indeed, establishing a nite marginal applicant for vanishing application costs has two
e¤ects. First, it reduces the probability that the rm benets from a good match as it lowers
the probability of hiring. Second, however, it increases the information available to the rm as
the applicant pool is more selective. The conditions (20-21) jointly determine the lowest type of
applicant v0A that the rm would be willing to attract. In particular, v
0
A is such that the rm
generates no prot when hiring an applicant of type v0A after an interview and following an optimal
hiring rule performed under ignorance of the applicants type (21).26
Equilibrium implications of match specicity We end this section by discussing two im-
portant properties of our model of person-to-organization match specicity: equilibrium exhibits
assortative matching and positive selection.
By assortative matching we mean that better candidates (for the rm) apply and better inter-
view performers are hired.27 This, of course, is a consequence of our assumption that all job-seekers
are homogenous in their outside option as they share the same productivity when employed else-
where. Trivially, a constant productivity implies that match value is independent across rms:
knowing the match value  provides no additional information about match value elsewhere. A
consequence of the independence of value across rms is that the model exhibits positive selection:
worsening the terms of trade, by reducing the wage,28 can only improve the quality of the applicant
pool. This of course will not be true if matches with higher synergies also have greater outside
options.29
26 If applications are truly costless, i.e. cA = 0; then, as in the case of contractible costs the rm could o¤er a wage
w and jobseekers are indi¤erent between applying to the rm and applying elsewhere. As employment in the rm
generates no rents, there is an equilibrium in which job-seekers can truthfully communicate their private type vA.
In this equilibrium, moreover, the rm is willing to evaluate all job-seekers. However, truthful communication of vA
disappears for any cA > 0 as the rm needs to pay a wage premium w > w to attract applicants.
27Notice that we need to accommodate the notion of assortative matching to our decentralized, sequential screening
process where rst job-seekers decide whether to match (after observing vA) and then the rm decides which matches
to keep and which to sever (after observing vF ). In this case it is possible that applicants with expected match value
E[jvA; vF ] are rejected (because vF < vF ) while applicants with E[jv0A; v0F ] < E[jvA; vF ] with lower match value
are accepted (because v0F > vF ). Following Smith (2011), our equilibrium is assortative in the sense that if (vA; vF )
are hired and (v0A; v
0
F ) are also hired, then (max{vA; v
0
Ag;max{vF ; v0F g) must also be hired, and if (vA; vF ) are not
hired (because they dont apply or, having applied, they dont meet the hiring standard) and (v0A; v
0
F ) are also not
hired, then (min{vA; v0Ag;min{vF ; v0F g) must also be hired
does not imply that all applicants with high match value when all information available is used apply and are hired.
Indeed an applicant with a high can nevertheless be rejected while an applicant with a lower value maybe accepted.
28This is restricting attention to the range of undominated strategies given in Lemma 3.
29The extent to which the presence of adverse selection a¤ects the returns to recruiting and selection activities is
explored in Alonso (2014a).
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5 The Equilibrium E¤ect of More Informative Signals on the Ap-
plicant Pool.
One of the implications of match specicity is that a rm may underinvest in screening applicants
or in informative advertising of job/rm characteristics if improving the information on either side
of the market has an adverse e¤ect on the applicant pool. To derive this result, I analyze in
this section the equilibrium e¤ect on the marginal applicant of a more precise interview interview
(higher hF ), and of better informed applicants (higher hA), for a xed wage w.30
5.1 Applicants Prediction and Firms Inference
I start by studying the e¤ect of more precise signals on the reaction functions bA(vA; p) and
bF (vA; w) dened in (8) and (9), for a xed hiring probability p and wage w.
Applicants Prediction Problem The reaction function bA(vA; p) species the maximum hiring
standard that a type vA passes with probability at least p. Improving the informativeness of the
interview, or of the applicants self-assessment, a¤ects bA(vA; p) through changes in the perceived
mean and variance of the interview score (where E[vF jvA] and 2vF jvA are given in (2) and (3)).
The next lemma summarizes the e¤ect on the applicants reaction function of a marginal increase
in hA or hF .
Lemma 5. (i) There exists ~vA(p) such that @bA=@hF > 0 i¤ vA > ~vA(p). Furthermore, @~vA=@p >
0 if and only if @vF jvA=@hF > 0. (ii) Finally ; @b
A=@hA > 0 if and only if p > 1=2 .
Lemma 5-i indicates that better screening leads to a counterclockwise rotation of bA around an
invariant type ~vA. That is, high types are more condent, while low types are less condent, of
beating a given hiring standard. Moreover, if one considers a higher passing probability, then less
applicant types are willing to beat a given standard if a better interview is also less predictable.
The intuition is as follows. First, applicants expect the interview score to be more responsive
to match value -good ex ante matches (vA > 0) expect higher average scores while poor ex ante
matches (vA < 0) expect lower average scores-. That is, the change in E[vF jvA] accounts for the
rotation of bA. Second, applicants payo¤s follow a call-option as applicants with low interview
scores are rejected and obtain their outside option. Thus, when a more informative interview is
also less predictable (@vF jvA=@hF > 0), it increases the hiring probability, and thus increases b
A,
30As shown in Section 6, this is su¢ cient to characterize the equilibrium marginal returns to recruitment and
selection as the envelope theorem implies that these marginal returns will be driven by the change in the precision of
signals holding constant the equilibrium wage.
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when p < 1=2 (i.e., the applicant is a "long shot"), but it will reduce his hiring probability if p > 1=2
(i.e., when the applicant is a "shoe-in" for the job). Moreover, the e¤ect of a more informative
interview on vF jvA is ambiguous: a higher hF leads to a higher correlation between vA and vF but
also increases the unconditional variance of vF . The combined e¤ect leads to a more predictable
interview score i¤ both hA and hF are su¢ ciently high. More specically we have that
@vF jvA
@hF
< 0() h0 < hAhF
h0 + hF + hA
: (22)
To understand Lemma 5-ii note that increasing hA does not a¤ect an applicants expected
interview score but reduces its variance. Therefore, if the applicant is a "shoe-in" (p > 1=2 ),
higher hA increases her chances of being hired, and thus @bA=@hA > 0, while it makes hiring less
likely if the applicant is a "long-shot" (p < 1=2 ), in which case @bA=@hA < 0.
Firms inference problem The reaction function bF (vA; w) gives the hiring standard that the
rm optimally sets when vA is the lowest type in the applicant pool and the rm must pay w to
every worker. The following lemma describes the e¤ect on bF of increasing hA or hF :
Lemma 6. For xed (vA; w) we have (i) @bF =@hF > 0; and (ii) @bF =@hA < 0 if p > 0; while
there exists vA such that @bF =@hA > 0 for vA < vAi¤

hA
h0+hA
3
hF
h0+hF
> 14 .
In words, a better interview always leads the rm to demand a higher hiring standard, while
the rm demands a higher hiring standard from better informed applicants if the applicant pool is
not su¢ ciently selective, but applicants are well informed and the interview is not too noisy. To
understand Lemma 6-i, recall that the rms posterior expectation after observing vF is
E[jvF ; vA  vA] =
h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
E[vAjvF ; vA  vA];
and a more informative interview would lead to a revision of this expectation according to
@E[jvF ; vA  vA]
@hF
=
hAvF   (h0 + hA)E[vAjvF ; vA  vA]
(h0 + hA + hF )
2 +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
@E[vAjvF ; vA  vA]
@hF
(23)
This expression reects the dual role of vF in providing a direct estimate of  and also allowing
to lter the applicants type. Looking at the rhs of (23), the rst term represents the increase in
the relative weight that the rm puts on the interview score compared to the "application signal"
fvA : vA  vAg, while the second term captures the e¤ect of a better interview on the rms ability
to "detect" which applicant is facing, that is the rms ability to sort "the wheat from the cha¤"
in the applicant pool. As a better interview provides a less noisy assessment of vA; it leads to a
reduction in the truncated expectation E[vAjvF ; vA  vA]. That is, for the same signal realizations
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vF and vA, the rm becomes less optimistic about the type of applicant it is evaluating. Combining
these e¤ects, Lemma 6-i states that improving the interview always makes the rm more skeptical
of match value as (23) is always negative. As a result, the rm will demand a higher hiring standard
when adopting a more informative interview regardless of the applicant pool.
We can follow a similar decomposition to study the e¤ect of better informed applicants on the
rms posterior expectation,
@E[jvF ; vA  vA]
@hA
=
hFE[vAjvF ; vA  vA]  (h0 + hF ) vF
(h0 + hA + hF )
2 +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
@E[vAjvF ; vA  vA]
@hA
(24)
Looking at the rhs of (24), the rst term is the increase in the relative weight of the application
signal, while the second term is the change in the rms ability to predict the applicants type. If
the applicant pool is selective, the rm puts more weight on the applicant signal and applicants
face less uncertainty about the interview. These two e¤ects imply that the rm lowers the required
hiring standard when applicants in a selective pool are better informed (cf. Lemma 6-ii). Lemma
6-ii also shows that advertising to a non-selective applicant pool would actually lead to a higher
hiring standard if applicants are su¢ ciently well informed.
5.2 Equilibrium e¤ects of improved screening and recruitment
How would applicants react to an interview process that imposes the same application costs but
better identies match value? When will better informed applicants be more willing to submit to
the rms hiring process? We can answer these questions by looking at the change in the reaction
functions described in Lemmas 5 and 6. Indeed, letting vA be the equilibrium marginal applicant
and p = cA=(wE   w); whenever
@bA (vA; p)
@hi
>
@bF (vA; wE)
@hi
; (25)
increasing hi lowers the equilibrium vA. This follows as the marginal applicant would be willing
to meet a strictly higher standard than the new one set by the rm. Conversely, if (25) does not
hold, then increasing hi would dissuade applications and lead to a more selective applicant pool.
We study separately the e¤ect of a better interview and the e¤ect of better informed job-seekers
on the applicant pool.
5.2.1 E¤ect of improved screening on the applicant pool
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium change in the marginal applicant for higher
hF .
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Figure 2: E¤ect of improved screening on marginal applicant.
Proposition 4 Consider a xed wE. Then, there exist two cut-o¤ levels 0 < pF  pF < 1 such that
@vA=@hF  0 if p  pF or p  pF ; while there exists p0 2 (pF ; pF ) such that @vA(wE ; p0)=@hF < 0.
Depending on the composition of the applicant pool, a more informative interview can either
dissuade more job-seekers from applying or encourage more applications. Lemma 5.i shows that a
better interview will induce high types to beat a tougher hiring standard, while it will discourage
low types. Furthermore, the rm always sets a higher hiring standard for a given applicant pool
in response to a less noisy interview (cf. Lemma 6-i). It readily follows then that if the marginal
applicant is weak (i.e., low vA) - or equivalently, when her probability of being hired is small-
a better interview induces a more selective applicant pool, as the rm demands a higher hiring
standard but low types expect lower average scores. If the marginal applicant is strong (i.e., high
vA), however, he is willing to beat a higher standard but the rm also rationally raises the hiring
standard. The proposition shows that this second e¤ect dominates, and a less noisy interview also
reduces applications from a selective applicant pool. Figure 2 summarizes these two cases of low
vA and high vA.
Finally, a better interview can actually induce more job-seekers to apply. This is the case
when the marginal applicant is "mediocre". Intuitively, the rms hiring standard increases less
in response to a better interview as the applicant pool becomes less selective. If the marginal
applicant expects higher average scores, however, then improving the interview can result in more
applications and aid the rms recruitment activity.
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Figure 3: E¤ect of improved recruitment on marginal applicant.
5.2.2 E¤ect of improved recruitment on the applicant pool
Suppose now that as a result of advertising, or the choice of recruitment channel, job-seekers are
better informed of match value. What e¤ect will it have on the equilibrium composition of the
applicant pool? The following proposition provides comparative statics on the marginal applicant
with respect to hA.
Proposition 5. Consider a xed wE. Then, there exist two cut-o¤ levels 0 < pA  pA < 12 such
that @vA(wE ; p)=@hA  0 if p  pA and @vA(wE ; p)=@hA  0 if p  pA .
Improving job-seekersinformation has opposite e¤ects on applications depending on how selec-
tive the applicant pool is. To see this, note that a relatively high hiring probability (in particular,
p  1=2) also implies a "strong" marginal applicant. Lemma 5-ii shows that increasing hA reduces
the perceived variance of the interview, and thus a strong marginal applicant is willing to beat
a higher hiring standard, while the rm reacts by lowering the hiring standard (cf. Lemma 6-ii).
Both e¤ects then lead to a reduction in the marginal applicant and an increase in the size of the
applicant pool. Conversely, a low hiring probability also implies a "weak" marginal applicant. On
the one hand, the rm may react to a higher hA by demanding a higher or lower hiring standard (cf.
Lemma 6-ii). On the other hand, however, the reduction in the option value of applying makes the
marginal applicant unwilling to beat the previous hiring standard. Proposition 5 shows that this
second e¤ect always dominates when the probability that the marginal applicant gains employment
is su¢ ciently low. Figure 3 shows graphically the e¤ect of increasing on both a non-selectiva and
a selective applicant pool.
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5.2.3 Interpreting e¤ects on the applicant pool as changes in the informativeness of
the application signal.
Propositions 4 and 5 show that improving the information in either side of the market has di¤erent
e¤ects on the composition of the applicant pool. We now interpret these results in the light of
the changes in the informativeness of the application signal as the applicant pool becomes more
selective. To this end, recall from Section 3 that a more selective applicant pool is also "more
informative", as the rm faces less uncertainty about the identity of a randomly drawn applicant.
This suggests two benchmarks: one where the rm regards the application signal as uninformative,
and one in which the applicants type is observed by the rm.
Benchmark 1: Uninformative "application signal". Suppose that the rm does not take
into account the self-selected nature of the applicant pool and believes that every applicant is a
random draw from the job-seekerspopulation. Then, the rm only considers the interview score to
appraise the applicants match value, and sets a xed hiring standard vF = w. In this case, changes
in hF or hA do not alter the hiring standard, and thus the marginal applicant behaves according
to Lemma 5. If the marginal applicant with a hiring probability p0 is still willing to apply after
increasing hF , this will be true for any p > p0: That is, a better interview encourages applications
when the marginal applicant is "strong" and discourages applications when the marginal applicant
is "weak". Moreover, a higher hA reduces the perceived variance of the interview score, and
thus dissuades weak applicants but encourages strong applicants. In summary, improving the
information on either side of the market always encourages applications when the applicant pool is
selective, and dissuades applicants for non-selective applicant pools.
Benchmark 2: Observable applicants type. Now consider a setup where vA is perfectly
observed by the rm, for instance because it is "hard" information and the applicant discloses it.
The rm then sets a type-dependent hiring standard vF (vA) according to
h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF (vA) +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vA = w: (26)
The applicants prediction problem is simplied in this case as the law of iterated expectations
implies that her estimated interview score is independent of the precision of the signals, i.e.,
E[E[jvF ; vA]jvA] = vA. Moreover, the conditional variance of E[jvF ; vA] given vA is simply
2E[jvF ;vA]jvA =
hF
(h0 + hA) (h0 + hF + hA)
;
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which always increases in hF and always decreases in hA. In e¤ect, when credentials are "hard
information", a better interview makes the rms nal assessment noisier to the applicant, while a
better informed applicant actually perceives the nal assessment as being less noisy. This implies
that improving the information on either side of the market has now opposing e¤ects: if the
applicant pool is very selective, a better interview discourages applicants and more informative
advertising encourages applications, while a non-selective applicant pool will be reduced if the rm
engages in informative advertising, but will actually attract more applicants upon adoption of a
more discriminating interview.
Equilibrium approximation for selective and non-selective applicant pools These two
benchmark cases exhibit opposing e¤ects in the extreme situations when the marginal applicant
has either a high or a low probability of being hired. Moreover, both cases provide good approx-
imations to the equilibrium given by (10) and (11). On the one hand, as the hiring probability
p = cA= (wE   w) tends to zero, the applicant pool becomes indistinguishable from the general
population of job seekers and
E[jvF ; vA  vA]  E[jvF ; vA 2 R] = vF :
In other words, when ex-ante sorting of applicants is muted, the rm rationally disregards the fact
that an applicant is willing to be evaluated. Therefore, for non-selective applicant pools, both a
better interview and more informative advertising dissuades applications.
On the other hand, when p is su¢ ciently large, the applicant pool is a fairly selective group of
job-seekers. Because the hazard rate of a normal distribution increases without bound, the expected
match value can be approximated by
E[jvF ; vA  vA] 
h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vA:
In e¤ect, a very selective applicant pool also provides a very informative signal of the applicants
type (in particular, the likelihood that a randomly chosen applicant is close to vA is large) and
the rms hiring rule approximates one in which the applicants type is observable to the rm,
and always equals vA. Therefore, for a selective applicant pool; a better interview also dissuades
applications while informative advertising actually attracts applicants.
6 Recruitment and Selection
I now consider the incentives of the rm to engage in activities that improve the recruitment or
the selection phase of the hiring process. First, the rm could improve recruitment by reducing
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frictions in the job-seekersapplication, e.g., through activities that lower cA. It is immediate that
the rm always benets from lower application costs as it can then attract the same applicant pool
at a lower wage.31 Second, the rm could face better informed job-seekers by either supplying
information through informative advertising or by using recruitment channels associated to more
knowledgeable job-seekers. Third, the rm could improve their selection of applicants by adopting
evaluation techniques that reduce the uncertainty surrounding the match-specic productivity. I
restrict attention to the latter two cases, and adopt a reduced-form approach by positing that
improving recruitment leads to a marginal increase in hA, while improving selection marginally
raises hF . In e¤ect, improving recruitment increases the information available to job-seekers, while
improving selection increases the information available to the rm through an interview.
What are the rms incentives to improve the information on each side of the market? Abstract-
ing from the costs of implementation, an application of the envelope theorem to the rms equi-
librium prots leads to the following decomposition of the total e¤ect of increasing hi, i 2 fA;Fg,
into a direct and indirect e¤ect,
d
dhi
=
@
@hi|{z}
direct e¤ect
+
@
@vA
dvA
dhi| {z }
indirect e¤ect
: (27)
Increasing hi implies that matching would be performed with a less noisy appraisal of match
value (direct e¤ect), but will a¤ect the recruitment costs of the rm as a result of the change
in the applicant pool (indirect e¤ect). To analyze (27), let  = Pr [vF  vF ; vA  vA] be the
probability that a randomly chosen job-seeker applies to the rm and is hired. Given the unit
mass of job-seekers,  also describes the equilibrium employment by the rm. Also, let i =
E

jvi; vj  vj

; i; j 2 fA;Fg and i 6= j. In words, A is the expected match productivity of the
marginal applicant that passes the interview test, while F is the expected match productivity of
the marginal hire.
Lemma 7. The direct and indirect e¤ect in (27) are given by
@
@hi
=
1
2(h0 + hi)
V ar

jvi; vj  vj
  @
@vi

| {z }
sorting e¤ect
+ (i   wE)
@
@hi| {z }
dispersion e¤ect
; (28)
@
@vA
= (A   wE)

@
@vA

< 0: (29)
31This argument relies on the assumption of positive selection, which is satised in our case. If a lower wage
reduces the ex-ante quality of the applicant pool -for instance if match specic productivity is correlated with each
applicants outside option-, then increasing frictions may actually improve hiring outcomes. See Horton (2013) for
some experimental evidence, and Alonso (2014a) for a theoretical analyisis of hiring in the presence of correlated
match productivity.
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for i; j 2 fA;Fg; i 6= j, where the change in employment following a more informative signal is
@
@hi
=
1
2 (hi + h0)
(i  
hi   h0
hi
vi)

  @
@vi

: (30)
To understand Lemma 7, consider rst (28) which is the direct e¤ect of a higher hi. The rst
term in (28) is the sorting e¤ect, and is proportional to the variance of match value at the margin of
the relevant decision maker. This term captures the idea that a more precise signal better separates
"the wheat from the cha¤" as it would lead to a stochastically higher vi for higher  and, conversely,
stochastically lower vi for lower . The second term in (28) is the dispersion e¤ect : a higher hi
increases the unconditional variance of vi and thus changes the likelihood that a random job-seeker
gains employment at the rm (by changing the likelihood of applying, or of being hired). The e¤ect
on prots then depends on whether raising hi increases employment (@=@hi), and on the rms
prot on the marginal decision maker (i   wE) :
Turning to the indirect e¤ect in (27), @=@vA is always strictly negative, as the rms monop-
sonistic behavior implies a strictly protable marginal applicant if hired, i.e., A > wE . Therefore,
the sign of the indirect e¤ect is given by the sign of dvA=dhi, i.e., on whether a more precise signal
dissuades or attracts applications in equilibrium. We next study the total e¤ect separately for
the case of a more discriminating interview, and the case of informative advertising of job/rm
characteristics.
6.1 Marginal Returns to Improved Selection.
How would the rm benet from having access to a marginally more informative interview? It is
easy to see that the direct e¤ect of a more discriminating interview is always positive. This follows
from two observations. First, sequentially rational hiring decisions require the rm to obtain a zero
prot on the marginal hire - thus F   wE = 0; and the dispersion e¤ect in (28) is zero-. That
is, changes in total employment, as more or less applicants pass the more discriminating interview,
have no e¤ect on rms prots when the rm makes no prot on the marginal hire. Second, the
sorting e¤ect in (28) is always positive: for the marginal hire vF , a better test would increase the
probability that vF < vF if  < vF ; while it would increase the probability that vF > vF if  > vF .
In e¤ect, a bad match would be more likely to fail the interview, thus reducing type I errors in
selection, while a good match would be more likely to pass it, thus reducing type II errors. As
this sorting e¤ect is proportional to the variance of the marginal hire, @=@hF decreases in hF and
vanishes as the interview becomes perfectly informative.
The indirect e¤ect @@vA
dvA
dhF
; where @=@vAis given by (29) and dvA=dhF is given in Proposition
5, captures the interdependence between recruitment and selection activities: a more discriminating
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interview a¤ects hiring costs through the equilibrim e¤ect on applicant recruitment. This e¤ect is
negative if and only if a better test dissuades applications (dvA=dhF > 0), as the rm would need
to pay a higher wage to attract the same applicant pool.
It follows that the total e¤ect is always positive if a better interview induces more applications.
Following Proposition 5, this is the case when the marginal applicant has an intermediate chance
of being hired. However, the total e¤ect can be very low and even negative so the rm actually
benets from a noisier interview. For instance, if the interview is very informative, the direct
e¤ect of further improvements is small. While the value of the marginal applicant can be quite
high, especially if application decisions are made with poor information, the e¤ect on the marginal
applicant dvA=dhF is also negligible as hF ! 1. Nevertheless, the following proposition shows
that, if a better interview dissuades applications, there is a threshold ~hF such that the total e¤ect
is always negative for hF > ~hF . In other words, a rm would cease to improve their interview
beyond ~hF , even if it is costless to perfectly assess match quality, for fear of dissuading job-seekers
from applying to the rm.
Proposition 6. (Negative total e¤ect of improved selection) Given hA and h0, there exist tH and
tL such that whenever w+cA < tL or w+cA > tH ; there exist ~hF such that d=dhF < 0 for any
hF > ~hF :
6.2 Marginal Return to Improved Recruitment.
Is the rm better-o¤ when recruiting from a population of better informed job-seekers? From (28),
the direct e¤ect of higher hA is
@
@hA
=
1
2(h0 + hA)
V ar [jvA; vF  vF ]

  @
@vA

+ (A   wE)
@
@hA
: (31)
The rst term in (31) is the sorting e¤ect of higher hA and is always positive: a less noisy vA leads
to a higher correlation between match value and the application decision, ultimately improving the
quality of the applicant pool. The second term in (31) is the dispersion e¤ect: a higher hA; by
increasing the unconditional variance of vA, leads to changes in the size of the applicant pool and
equilibrium employment. Noting that the marginal applicant that passes the interview is always a
protable match, i.e., A > wE , the dispersion e¤ect is negative if and only if the rms employment
is reduced when job-seekers are better informed.
Can the direct e¤ect (31) be negative? The answer is yes. To see this note that combining (30)
for i = A with (31), we have
sign

@
@hi

= sign

V ar [jvA; vF  vF ] + (A   wE)(A  
hA   h0
hA
vA)

: (32)
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If the marginal applicant is below the population average (vA < E[] = 0), the second term of
(32) becomes unbounded from below as hA becomes arbitrarily small. That is, when job-seekers
have very poor information concerning their person-organization t, but nevertheless the majority
of them apply for a job, then informative advertising would actually reduce rms prots, holding
constant application and hiring decisions. The intuition is that more informative signals can have an
adverse impact under suboptimal decision rules, as too few applicants apply and thus A wE > 0:
Therefore the standard monopsony ine¢ ciency in rm recruitment then leads to a negative value
of information (for the rm), holding constant application decisions. A general lesson in matching
markets with dispersed information is that improved information leads to better matching (Shimer
and Smith 2000). In this case, however, even absent the strategic impact on application and
selection, better informed applicants can be detrimental to the rm.
The total e¤ect of improved recruitment is positive is positive whenever it leads to more appli-
cations, both because it increases the mass of applicants that believe are a good match and also
attracts applications from lower types. Conversely, as the following proposition shows, the total
e¤ect of facing better informed job-seekers can actually be negative.
Proposition 7. (Negative total e¤ect of recruitment) Given hA and h0; there exist tA < 0 such
that whenever cA + w < tA there exist a threshold ~hA such that d=dhA < 0 for hA < ~hA.
Interestingly, the proposition shows that if job-seekers are poorly informed of t the rm may
nevertheless never prot from reducing their uncertainty about match value. This is the case when
the average job-seeker is a good match for the rm (and application costs are low) and a majority
apply to the rm (so that vA < 0). Providing some information to job-seekers may lead applicants
to apply elsewhere, although this decision is made with a very noisy assessment of match value.
7 Extensions
A feature of this hiring model is that, apart from information asymmetries, the only other friction
hindering matching is the application cost cA. In this section I perform a robustness check of the
main insights by allowing for alternative (and perhaps more realistic) matching frictions. First, I
extend the basic analysis by allowing for a costly interview, i.e., cF > 0. I then consider the e¤ect
of slot constraints on the incentives to improve screening and recruitment, and the interaction
between pre-hiring screening and post-hiring on-the-job learning on the applicant pool that a rm
attracts. I show that the main insight of the paper -that improving the information of either side
of the market may raise a rms hiring costs when it discourages applications- continues to hold,
although the equilibrium e¤ect on the applicant pool can be noticeably more complex.
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7.1 Costly Firm Evaluation
Suppose now that cF > 0, so that interviewing a positive mass m of applicants generates costs
cFm > 0. While applicants still need to incur the applications costs prior to employment, now the
rm must decide whether or not to interview applicants. As both the benet of interviewing an
applicant and the marginal cost of an interview are constant, for a given applicant pool the rm
will either interview all applicants or interview none.
To study the equilibrium implications of costly interviews, suppose that all types in the set A
apply to the rm and let the hiring standard vF be given by (4). Then, the rm evaluates applicants
i¤
E[   wE jvF  vF ; vA 2 A] Pr [vF  vF jvA 2 A]  cF +max f0; E[   wE jvA 2 A]g : (33)
To understand (33), suppose rst that the rm would not hire an applicant in the absence of an
interview, i.e., E[   wE jvA 2 A] < 0. Then (33) translates to
E[   wE jvF  vF ; vA 2 A] Pr [vF  vF jvA 2 A]  cF :
That is the rm only hires if the (positive) match surplus from a hired applicant, multiplied by the
probability of hiring a random applicant from a pool A, exceeds the interview cost. Now suppose
that the rm would hire an applicant in the absence of an interview. In this case, (33) translates
to
 E[   wE jvF < vF ; vA 2 A] Pr [vF < vF jvA 2 A]  cF : (34)
That is the expected gain from screening out poor matches, multiplied by the probability that a
bad match is detected and denied employment, exceeds the interview cost.
Who would the rm attract if it does not evaluate applicants? There is always a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium when the rm cannot interview in which the rm o¤ers wE = w + cA, and
only job-seekers with type vA  w + cA apply to the rm. When the interview cost is cF , this is
an equilibrium as long as
 E[   wE jvF < vF ; vA  wE ] Pr [vF < vF jvA  wE ] < cF :
That is, for su¢ ciently high interview costs, the rm can credibly commit not to interview appli-
cants, and all job-seekers with vA  wE apply and are hired by the rm. In fact, this application
behavior maximizes the rms prot given that it does not interview applicants.
One implication of costly interviews is that the rm will attract less applicants and, therefore,
will pay a lower wage. To see this suppose that the rm does not hire without an interview. Then,
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the optimal wage satises the rst order condition
Pr [vF  vF ; vA  vA] = (E[   wE jvF  vF ; vA] Pr [vF  vF ; vA]  cF )

  dvA
dwE

wE=w

E
which would lead to a lower wage when compared to (19).
If the rm only hires after an interview and it evaluates all applicants, then the comparative
statics of improved selection and recruitmet of Section 5 still hold. Suppose now that the rm does
not interview workers, so that all types vA  w + cA apply and are hired. In this case, raising
hA is always benecial for the rm. That is, the rm always benets from facing better informed
job-seekers when it eschews the interview and hires all applicants. The key is in the sorting and
dispersion e¤ect in (28) of higher hA. If the rm does not evaluate workers then vA = wE and the
rm makes a zero prot on the marginal applicant, implying that the dispersion e¤ect is always
zero. As the sorting e¤ect is always positive, and the precision of job-seekers type does not a¤ect
application decisions (as vA = wE), then the total e¤ect is always positive.
Finally, suppose that the rm does not currently evaluate applicants but has access to a more
discriminating interview. Note that even if (34) is now satised for higher hF and an applicant pool
fvA : vA  w + cAg, the fact that applicants now face a positive probability of rejection will lead
then to demand a large wage premium. In fact, if (34) is satised with equality so that the rm
has access to an interview technology that makes it indi¤erent between interviewing applicants or
hire without an interview, then it will never adopt marginal improvements to its informativeness.
7.2 Slot constraints
In many realistic settings, rms have a xed number of vacancies that they need to ll. Then, if all
applicants prove to be good matches after the interview, only the top performers will be hired. To
accommodate this possibility, suppose that the rm can hire at most a measure K of workers. To
simplify the analysis, I assume that this constraint is binding, so that total employment is always
equal to K.
In the base model applicants exerted an informational externality as a larger number of ap-
plications would lower the rms assessment of each applicant, and thus each applicants hiring
probability. In contrast, when the rm only faces slot constraints, then applicants impose a conges-
tion externality as a larger number of applications lowers each applicants hiring probability when
they all vie for a limited number of positions. The following proposition shows that the rms hiring
rule can still be described by a threshold hiring standard, and derives the optimal wage.
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Proposition 8. (SC-Equilibrium) If the rms employment is limited to a mass K of workers,
then
(i) There exist a marginal applicant vSA and hiring standard v
S
F such that all types vA  vSA
apply to the rm, and the rm hires an applicant i¤ vF  vSF . The marginal applicant vSA and the
hiring standard vSF are the unique solution to
Pr

vF  vSF ; vA  vSA

= K; (35)
vSF = bA(v
S
A;
cA
wE   w ): (36)
(ii) Letting vSF (v
S
A) be dened implicitly by (35) and v
S
A(wE) is dened by
Pr

vF  bA(vSA;
cA
wE   w ); vA  v
S
A

= K; (37)
then the optimal wage wE solves 
@
@vSA
+
@
@vSF
@vSF
@vSA

dvSA
@wE
= K: (38)
Proposition 8-i shows that slot constraints do not change the assortative nature of equilibrium: all
types that believe to be a good match apply to the rm, but only the (mass) K top performers are
hired. Figure 4 depicts the reaction functions (35) and (36) for the case that K < 1=2: Proposition
8-ii describes the rms optimal wage. Since the rms reaction function (35) does not change
with the wage, it follows that dvSA=@wE is always negative: higher wages always generate more
applications. The binding slot constraint implies that as the rm attracts more applicants it must
also raise its hiring standard. This implies that the value of the marginal applicant as given by
(38) is still positive, albeit smaller than the case with unlimited vacancies (19).
Because the rms reaction function (35) is now driven by a slot constraint, the equilibrium
e¤ects of improved information are di¤erent from the ones obtained in Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 9. (Recruitment and Selection) Let p =cA= (wE   w) and vSA as dened by (37).
Then
(i) Increasing hF always dissuades applicants, i.e.,
dvSA
@hF
> 0,
(ii) There exist pS such that increasing hA dissuades applicants i¤ p < pS.
Unlike Proposition 6, Proposition 9-i shows that improving the interview will always dissuade
applications. The reason in this case is that increasing hF increases the conditional variance of
vF =vA and leads to a stochastically larger order statistics. That is, the for a xed applicant pool, a
higher hF increases the lowest score of the top K performers. This forces the rm to raise the hiring
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Figure 4: Hiring Standard and Marginal Applicant when rm hires a mass K of workers.
standard to satisfy the slot constraint. Proposition 9-ii shows that better informed jobseekers are
discouraged from applying if the marginal applicant is a "long-shot", i.e., when its hiring probability
is low.
While the comparative statics of application decisions do change in the presence of slot con-
straints, the main insight still holds: Because the marginal applicant is still strictly protable for
the rm, discouraging her application also raises hiring costs. In contrast to the setup without slot
constraints, this is always case with a more discriminating interview.
7.3 On-the-job learning about Match Quality
In the model the rm screen applicants in order to avoid unsuitable matches (if it would other-
wise hire all applicants without an interview) or to uncover good matches (if it would otherwise
refrain from hiring applicants that are not interviewed). Typically, rms also learn progressively
about match value once the worker is employed, and could limit the impact of adverse matches by
terminating the employment relationship (Jovanovic 1979, see Waldman 2013 for a comparison to
alternative learning theories). Indeed, on-the-job learning about match quality, coupled with cost-
less termination, provides rms with an incentive to favor "risky workers" where the uncertainty
over match value is higher (Lazear 1995).
The literature has shown that these two informational sources of match value -interviews and
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on-the-job learning- act as substitutes (Pries and Rogerson 2005), so that rms that nd it relatively
easy/costless to learn about match value from the workers performance are less willing to invest
in pre-employment screening. We could formally incorporate the e¤ect of on-the-job learning on
termination of bad matches by imposing a lower bound on the match-specic productivity of a
worker. To this end, suppose that during post-hiring employment the rm can costlessly eliminate
matches whose quality does not exceed a given threshold, say . Then f() = max [; ] is the
productivity of a  worker when employed by the rm, and the rms hiring standard (4) when
types in the set A apply now satises
E

f()jvLF (A); vA 2 A

= wE :
Because f is a non-decreasing transformation of , the expectation E [f()jvF ; vA 2 A] is monotone
in vF . Therefore, the equilibrium will again be characterized by a threshold hiring rule and a
monotone application decision. Furthermore, since f()  , then the rm will set a lower hiring
standard for any application decision, that is for given wE ; vLF (A)  vF (A), where vF (A) satises
(4). In sumary, as on-the-job learning limits the rms downside from employing risky workers, the
rm rationally sets a lower hiring standard and employs more workers.
While on-the-job learning will a¤ect the incentives of the rm to submit applicants to an in-
terview, our main qualitative results regarding the e¤ects of improving prior to employment the
information on both sides of the market will still hold in this case (albeit in a di¤erent parameter
range). Interestingly, the model sheds light on the incentives of rms to provide better informa-
tion to job-seekers when both pre-employment screening and on-the-job learning are present. For
instance, when the applicant pool is selective (e.g., when w+ cA >> 0), a rm may want to adver-
tise to job-seekers even in the presence of on-the-job learning. Advertising has little informational
consequences on match quality in this case, but it reassures the marginal applicant of passing the
interview test, thus lowering the hiring costs of the rm.
8 Conclusions
A basic tenet of Human Resource Management is that a limiting factor for pre-employment screen-
ing is the costly resources that need to be deployed to probe each applicant. That is, the rm would
surely prefer a selection process that does not require more resources and yet is more informative of
a workerss expected productivity. Conversely, it is understood that it is the advertising costs what
refrains rms from providing more information to prospective applicants about the characteristics
of the job and the work environment. I show this view to be incomplete in that rms also incur
34
indirect costs from improved screening or informative advertising. In particular, when the rm
cannot contractually cover applicants costs, improvements that discourage applications raise hiring
costs as the rm must increase the wage premium to attract the same applicant pool.
The driving force in the analysis is job-seekers perceptions of their suitability for the job,
which, given the interview process, determines each applicants likelihood of receiving an o¤er. For
instance, a more discriminating interview changes both the mean and variance of each applicants
interview score, and discourages applications when the applicant pool is both very selective and non-
selective, but can also result in more applications. Moreover, informative advertising of rm/job
characteristics reduces job-seekers uncertainty of the value of matching with the rm, and makes the
interview process less noisy. Whether a more predictable interview also leads to more applications
depends on whether the lowest applicant type has a high or low likelihood of being hired.
The concern with the costs of attracting the more promising prospects shapes the rms will-
ingness to improve recruitment or selection. I show that rms will never adopt a perfect interview,
even if it is costless, when a more discriminating evaluation makes the marginal applicant less
likely to gain employment, and thus less willing to be evaluated in the rst place. Firms may avoid
advertising for similar reasons. Interestingly, rms will be unwilling to advertise when applicants
are poorly informed and yet apply to the rm.
There are two main simplications of the model. First, only one rm actively evaluates appli-
cants. This obviates the possible e¤ect of competition on the returns to adopting a more discrim-
inating interview or providing information about match quality. Second, the models posits that
all uncertainty surrounding the productivity of a worker regards its rm-specic component. In
equilibrium, this leads to both positive assortative matching and positive selection. This setup can
be useful for studying situations where general human capital can be easily observed, albeit there is
uncertainty over job/organization t. Nevertheless, there are situations where general human cap-
ital is not perfectly known and pre-hiring assessment is necessarily imperfect. In this case, a high
match value with a given rm may also imply a higher outside option when matching with other
rms. This e¤ect can then lead to both positive and adverse selection. Alonso (2014a) provides an
initial exploration of both scenarios.
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9 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that all job-seekers vA 2 A apply to the rm and are evaluated. As
the rm cannot commit ex-ante to arbitrary hiring rules, it will issue an employment o¤er as long
as
E [ jvF ; vA 2 A ]  wE .
We now show that E [ jvF ; vA 2 A ] is strictly increasing in vF with an unbounded range, implying
that (i) there is a unique solution to
E


vF (A0); vA 2 A0  = wE ;
and (ii) whenever vF  vF (A0) the rm hires the applicant.
First we have that
E [ jvF ; vA 2 A ] =
Z
A
E [ jvF ; vA ] f (vF ; vA)
Pr [vF ; vA 2 A]dvA =
Z
A0
E [ jvF ; vA ] f (vA=vF )
Pr [vA 2 A=vF ]dvA
=
Z
A

h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
vA

f (vA=vF )
Pr [vA 2 A=vF ]dvA
=
h0 + hF
h0 + hF + hA
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
Z
A
vA
f (vA=vF )
Pr [vA 2 A=vF ]dvA
To establish that E [ jvF ; vA 2 A0 ] increases in vF we will show that the last term is non-decreasing
in vF . This su¢ ces for both claims as the rst term is strictly increasing and admits neither a lower
bound nor an upper bound in vF .
First, vF and vA satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) as they satisfy it with
the random variable  (Karlin and Rubin 1956), that is, f (vA=v0F ) =f (vA=vF ) increases in vA for
v0F > vF . Now consider, with v
0
F > vF the expressionZ
A0
vA
 
f (vA=v
0
F )
Pr

vA 2 A0=v0F
   f (vA=vF )
Pr [vA 2 A0=vF ]
!
dvA: (39)
The MLRP of vF and vA implies that the function
f (vA=v
0
F )
f (vA=vF )
  Pr [vA 2 A
0=v0F ]
Pr [vA 2 A0=vF ]

1
Pr

vA 2 A0=v0F

is increasing in vA, andZ
A0

f (vA=v
0
F )
f (vA=vF )
  Pr [vA 2 A
0=v0F ]
Pr [vA 2 A0=vF ]

f (vA=vF )
Pr

vA 2 A0=v0F
dvA = 0:
Lemma 1 in Persico (2000) then implies that (39) is non-negative.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose that the rm hires any applicant that it evaluates if vF  vF . Then
the expected gain to an applicant of type vA from incurring the costs and applying is
(wE   w) Pr [vF  vF jvA]  cA:
The proof of Lemma 1 showed that vF and vA satisfy the MLRP. This implies that vF =v0A rst
order stochastically dominates vF =vA when v0A > vA, meaning that if type vA is willing to incur
the cost cA and apply, so will any type v0A > vA. Finally, in our normally distributed example we
have that vF =vA is normally distributed with mean (hF =hF + h0) vA and variance independent of
vA. Therefore, for any nite vF , Pr [vF  vF jvA] is injective and takes any value in (0; 1) for nite
vA. Therefore, for each vF there is a unique vA(vF ) such that (7) is satised.
Proof of Proposition 1: If wE  w < cA then no job-seeker will apply as the wage premium does
not cover the application costs. If wE w  cA, then any sequential equilibrium must satisfy (4) and
(7); in particular, Lemma 2 implies that the applicant pool must be of the form A = fvA : vA  vAg.
Let bF (vA; w) as dened by (9) and bA(vA; p) as dened as by (8). Then (4) in Lemma 1 can be
written as
bF (vA; wE) = vF
while ((7) in Lemma 2 can be written as
bA(vA;
cA
wE   w ) = vF :
We now show that bF (vA; wE) is strictly decreasing in vA while bA(vA;
cA
wE w ) is strictly increas-
ing in vA. This implies that given wE  w + cA, there is a unique continuation equilibrium where
the applicant pool is A = fvA : vA  vAg and the rms hiring standard is vF that solve (10-11).
First, joint normality implies that bA(vA; p) is given by
bA(vA; p) = E[vF jvA] + vF jvA 1 (p)
and thus
@bA(vA; p)
@vA
=
@E[vF jvA]
@vA
=
hA
h0 + hA
> 0:
Second, joint normality of signals allows us to write
E


vF ; v0A  vA  = vF + h0 + hAh0 + hF + hAvAjvF 

vA   E[vAjvF ]
vAjvF

and thus
@E [ jvF ; v0A  vA ]
@vA
=
h0 + hA
h0 + hF + hA
0

vA   E[vAjvF ]
vAjvF

> 0
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where positivity follows from the positive derivative of the hazard rate of the normal distribution.
Lemma 1 alreadys determined that @E [ jvF ; v0A  vA ] =@vF > 0. Therefore
@bF (vA; p)
@vA
=  
@E[jvF ;v0AvA ]
@vA
@E[jvF ;v0AvA ]
@vF
< 0:

Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that the rm can condition payments on whether the applicant
incurred the application costs. The rm then o¤ers a contract that pays c; cA > c  0; if the
applicant incurred the costs cA and a wage wC ; wC > w; if the applicant is hired. Let vA be the
marginal applicant in this case, i.e., vA solves
(wC   w) Pr [vF  vF jvA] = cA   c; (40)
E [jvA  vA; vF ] = wC ;
and rm prots are
 =
Z 1
vA
Z 1
vF
Z

(   wC)dF (; vF ; vA)  c
Z 1
vA
Z

dF (; vA)
Consider now a contract that pays w0C < wC and c
0 > c, and induces the same marginal appli-
cant. A lower wage induces a lower hiring standard v0F < vF and thus  = Pr [vF  v0F jvA]  
Pr [vF  vF jvA] > 0. The change in rms prots  from switching to this new contract is
 =
Z 1
vA
Z vF
v0F
Z

( w0C)dF (; vF ; vA)+Pr [vA  vA]

(wC   w0C) Pr [vF  vF jvA  vA] 
 
c0   c :
The rst term is non-negative as E[jvA  vA; vF ] > w0C for vF > v0F . The term (wC  
w0C) Pr [vF  vF jvA  vA] is the expected reduction in wage payments to each applicant inter-
viewed. We then have that
 
wC   w0C

Pr [vF  vF jvA  vA] 
 
wC   w0C

Pr [vF  vF jvA]
= c0   c+   w0C   w
> c0   c
where the equality follows from (40). Therefore  > 0, which implies that any contract that does
not fully cover the applicants e¤ort costs is dominated.
Consider therefore the contract (c; wC) = (cA; w). In this case, any job-seeker is indi¤erent
between applying to the rm and exerting e¤ort, and not applying. If the rm could optimally
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choose the marginal applicant vCA, and given sequentially rational decisions, the optimal choice
would satisfy the rst order condition
@
@vA
=  
Z 1
vF
Z

(   w)dF (; vF ; vCA) + cAf(vCA) = 0
which is equivalent to (15). To see that this is the unique equilibrium consider a potential equilib-
rium in which job-seekers application is a set A 6= vA  vCA	. Then the rm, by raising wC above
w and lowering c can induce a monotone application fvA  vAg with vA arbitrarily close to vCA. As
the rm has a protable deviation, the set A cannot dene an equilibrium application decision.
Proof of Lemma 3: Let vA (wE) be the unique solution to (10-11). Using the representations
(12) and (14) and implicitly di¤erentiating we have
dvA (wE)
dwE
=
1 
h
1  hAh0+hF+hA
0(z)
i
0 (wE)
hF+h0
0(z)
h0+hF
(41)
where z = (vA   E[vAjvF ]) =vAjvF and  (wE) =  vF jvA 1 (cA= (wE   w)). For the standard
normal distribution 0 < 0(z) < 1, thus the denominator is positive and bounded. To study the
numerator of (41) consider
0 (wE) = vF jvA
c
 ( 1 (cA= (wE   w))) (wE   w)2
=
= vF jvA


vF E[vF jvA]
vF jvA

(wE   w)

vF E[vF jvA]
vF jvA

= vF jvA
1
(wE   w)

vF E[vF jvA]
vF jvA

where we have exploited the symmetry of  (x). First, this derivative approaches1 as wE ! w+cA,
and thus (41) becomes unbounded from below. In other words, vA (wE) increases smoothly without
bound as wE ! w + cA. Second we can show that the numerator of (41) changes sign at most
once. Let wmax be the wage at which (41) is zero. As the range of vA has no upper bound,
this implies that for each wage above wmax there exist a wage below wmax that induce the same
marginal applicant at a lower wage. As rm prots are higher at this lower wage, the higher wage
is dominated and would never be o¤ered in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3: First we formally derive the expression (17). First, as vi= is normally
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distributed we haveZ 1
vi
dF (vi=) = 1  

vi   E[vi=]
vi=

= 1  
24vi   hihi+h0 p
hi
hi+h0
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= 
p
hi

   hi + h0
hi
vi

=  [zi(; vi)] ;
with zi(; vi) =
p
hi [   vi (hi + h0) =hi], i = A;F: Then from independence of vF = and vA=
we obtainZ 1
 1
Z 1
vF
Z 1
vA
(   wE) dF (; vA; vF ) =
Z 1
 1
(   wE)
Z 1
vF
dF (vF =)
Z 1
vA
dF (vA=)dF ()
=
Z 1
 1
(   wE)  [zA(; vA)]  [zF (; vF )] dF ():
Let vF (wE) and vA(wE) be the solutions to (10) and (11). As the rm sets vF optimally given
the applicant pool fvA : vA  vAg, applying the envelope theorem yields
d
dwE
=
@
@wE
+
@
@vA
dvA (wE)
dwE
= 0
Let  = Pr[vF  vF ; vA  vA] the probability that a random job-seeker applies and is hired. Given
the unit mass of job seekers,  is also the employment level of the rm. Then the previous rst
order condition can be written as
   dvA (wE)
dwE
Z 1
 1
Z 1
vF
(   wE) dF (; vA; vF ) = 0
which can be written as
   dvA (wE)
dwE
E[   wE jvF  vF ; vA] Pr[vF  vF ; vA] = 0
from which we can readily obtain (19).
Proof of Lemma 5: From (8) we have
bA(vA; p) =
hF
hF + h0
vA   vF jvA 1(p):
Di¤erentiating bA wrt hF shows that @bA=@hF  0 i¤ vA > ~vA where ~vA satises @bA(~vA)=@hF = 0
and is given by
~vA =
(hF + h0)
2
h0
@vF jvA
@hF
 1(p):
As  1(p) increases in p and (22) shows that @vF jvA=@hF > 0 i¤h0 <
hAhF
h0+hF+hA
; then ~vA increases
in p i¤ h0 <
hAhF
h0+hF+hA
. Finally, from (3) we have that @vF jvA=@hA < 0 so that sign (@bA=@hA) =
sign
 
 1(p)

. Therefore @bA=@hA > 0 if and only if p > 1=2:
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Proof of Lemma 6: The rms reaction curve bF (vA; w) is the hiring standard that satises (9).
Dene
G(vA; vF ) = vF +
s
hA
(h0 + hF ) (h0 + hA + hF )
 (~z(vA; vF )) , with (42)
~z(vA; vF ) =
vA   hAhA+h0 vF
vA=vF
; (43)
r =  1(p): (44)
We rst characterize the behavior of ~z with changes in r. By replacing the applicants reaction
function (8) into (43) we can write
vA=vF ~z =

1  hA
hA + h0
hF
hF + h0

vA +
hA
hA + h0
vF =vAr:
Because vA increases with p, and thus it increases with r; and r admits neither a lower nor an
upper bound; ~z also increases monotonically with r in an unbounded fashion.
Letting E[jvF ; vA  vA] = G(vA; vF ); the function bF is implicitly dened by G(vA; bF ) = w
and applying the implicit function theorem one obtains
@bF
@hi
=   @G(vA; vF )=@hi
@G(vA; vF )=@vF
:
The denominator is always positive, since
@G(vA; vF )
@vF
= 1  hA
hA + h0 + hF
0(~z) > 1  hA
hA + h0 + hF
> 0: (45)
Thus, sign
h
@bF
@hi
i
=  sign [@G(vA; vF )=@hi] : Consider rst the change wrt hF . After some manip-
ulations, we obtain
@G(vA; vF )
@hF
=
s
hA
(h0 + hF )
3 (h0 + hA + hF )
P; with (46)
P =  (2h0 + hA + 2hF )
2 (h0 + hA + hF )
 (~z) +
hA
(h0 + hA + hF )
~z0 (~z) (47)
The hazard rate of a normal distribution satises z 
0(z)
(z)  1; so
 

2h0 + hA + 2hF
hA

+
~z0 (~z)
 (~z)
  

2
h0 + hF
hA
+ 1

+ 1 < 0;
and thus @G(vA; vF )=@hF < 0; implying that
@bF
@hF
> 0.
Consider now the change wrt hA. Again, after some manipulations we have
@G(vA; vF )
@hA
= 

(~z) +
2hA
h0 + hA
r0 (~z)

(48)
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with
 =
(h0 + hF ) (h0 + hA)
2hA (h0 + hA + hF )
2vA=vF > 0;
(~z) =  (~z)  ~z0 (~z) : (49)
The function (~z) is positive, quasiconcave, with a maximum at ~z = 0 and limj~zj!1 (~z) = 0. Since
0 (~z)  0 we then have that if r  0 (i.e. if the probability that the marginal applicant is hired is
at least 1=2) then @G(vA; vF )=@hA > 0 and thus
@bF
@hA
< 0. To study the case of r < 0, di¤erentiate
(~z) + 2hAh0+hA r
0 (~z) with respect to r to obtain
d
dr

(~z) +
2hA
h0 + hA
r0 (~z)

=

 ~z + 2hA
h0 + hA
r

@~z
@r
00 (~z)
0 (~z)
+
2hA
h0 + hA

0 (~z) :
The ratio 00 (~z) =0 (~z) is positive, decreasing, and becomes unbounded when r !  1 (so that
~z !  1). Moreover, as r !  1 we have vF  w and
vA 
h0 + hF
hF
w +
(h0 + hF )vF =vA
hF
r;
~z  h0 h0 + hA + hF
hF (h0 + hA)vA=vF
w +
r
h0 + hF
hF
h0 + hA
hA
r;
@~z
@r

r
h0 + hF
hF
h0 + hA
hA
;
which leads to
lim
r! 1

 ~z + 2hA
h0 + hA
r

@~z
@r
= &
r
h0 + hF
hF
h0 + hA
hA
lim
r! 1 r; with
& =
 
 
r
h0 + hF
hF
h0 + hA
hA
+
2hA
h0 + hA
!
:
Since limr! 1
00(~z)
0(~z) =1, then limr! 1

 ~z + 2hAh0+hA r

@~z
@r
00(~z)
0(~z) =  1 i¤ & > 0, i.e. i¤ hFh0+hF

hA
h0+hA
3
>
1
4 . Therefore
lim
r! 1
@bF
@hA
> 0 i¤
hF
h0 + hF

hA
h0 + hA
3
>
1
4
:
Therefore, there exists pA and associated vA = vA
 
pA

such that @bF@hA > 0 for vA < vA i¤
hF
h0+hF

hA
h0+hA
3
> 14 .
Proof of Proposition 4: Dene
t (vA) =
hF
h0 + hF
vA   vF =vAr; (50)
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with r dened by (44). Then the equilibrium marginal applicant is implicitly dened by
G(vA; t (vA)) = w;
with G dened by (42). We can apply the implicit function theorem to obtain
@vA
@hi
=  
@G
@hi
+ @G@vF
@t
@hi
@G
@vA
+ @G@vF
@t
@vA
:
Letting ~z as dened by (43), then
@G
@vA
=
h0 + hA
h0 + hA + hF
0 (~z) > 0;
@G
@vF
= 1  hA
(h0 + hA + hF )
0 (~z) > 1  hA
(h0 + hA + hF )
> 0;
@t
@vA
=
hF
h0 + hF
> 0;
so
sign

@vA
@hi

=  sign

@G
@hi
+
@G
@vF
@t
@hi

: (51)
Considering the case of changes in hF we have that @G=@hF and @G=@vF are given by (46) and
(45), and
@t
@hF
=
h0
(h0 + hF )
2 vA  
@vA=vF
@hF
:
To shorten expressions, let dvA =
hA
h0+hA
and dvF =
hF
h0+hF
. After some manipulations, we can write
sign

@G
@hF
+
@G
@vF
@t
@hF

= sign
"
P +

1  hA
(h0 + hA + hF )
0 (~z)
 
~z   1
2
p
dvF dvA
r
!#
with P dened by (47). We now study the limiting behavior of the rhs of the previous expression
as r becomes unbounded. First, for r !  1 we have vF  w so that
vA  1
dvF
w +
vF =vA
dvF
r;
~z  (1  dvAdvF )
dvF
w
vA=vF
+
1p
dvF dvA
r; 
~z   1
2
p
dvF dvA
r
!
 (1  dvAdvF )
dvF
w
vA=vF
+
1
2
p
dvF dvA
r:
Since, r !  1 implies that ~z !  1, we have the following limits
lim
r! 1 (~z) = limr! 1
0 (~z) = lim
r! 1 ~z
0 (~z) = 0; (52)
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so that
lim
r! 1
@G
@hF
+
@G
@vF
@t
@hF
= lim
r! 1 ~z  
1
2
p
dvF dvA
r =  1:
Therefore, there exists pF such that

@G
@hF
+ @G@vF
@t
@hF

< 0 for p < pF , implying that @vA@hF > 0
for p < pF .
Second, as r !1 we have
h0 + hF
h0 + hA + hF
vF +
h0 + hA
h0 + hA + hF
vA  w
implying
w  h0 + hF
h0 + hA + hF
 
dvF vA   vF =vAr

+
h0 + hA
h0 + hA + hF
vA
vA  w + h0 + hF
h0 + hA + hF
vF =vAr
Since r !1 implies that ~z !1, we obtain the following limits
lim
r!1
 (~z)
~z
= lim
r! 1
0 (~z) = 1;
so
lim
r!1

@G
@hF
+
@G
@vF
@t
@hF

= lim
r!1
 
  h0 + hF
h0 + hA + hF
~z +

h0 + hF
h0 + hA + hF
 
~z   1
2
p
dvF dvA
r
!!
= lim
r!1 

h0 + hF
h0 + hA + hF
 
1
2
p
dvF dvA
r
!
=  1
Therefore, there exists pF such that

@G
@hF
+ @G@vF
@t
@hF

< 0 for p > pF , implying that @vA@hF > 0 for
p > pF . 
Proof of Proposition 5: From the proof of Proposition 4 we have that sign
h
@vA
@hi
i
satises (51).
Through di¤erentiation, we have
@G
@hA
=
(h0 + hF ) (h0 + hA)
2hA (h0 + hA + hF )
2vA=vF
 
 (~z)  ~z0 (~z)+ h0 + hF
(h0 + hA + hF )
2vF =vAr
0 (~z) ;
@t
@hA
=
hF
(h0 + hA + hF ) (h0 + hA)
vF =vAr;
with ~z and r dened in (43) and (44). After some calculations we obtain
@G
@hA
+
@G
@vF
@t
@hA

= ' (~z) + 

h0
hF
0 (~z) + 1

r; (53)
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with  (~z) dened in (49), and
' =
(h0 + hF ) (h0 + hA)
2hA (h0 + hA + hF )
2vA=vF > 0;
 =

1 +
hF
h0 + hA
s
hF
h0 + hF
3 hA
h0 + hA
> 0:
As noted in the proof of lemma 6, the function (~z) is quasiconcave, and satises 0 < (~z) <  (0)
with limj~zj!1 (~z) = 0. Since 0 (~z) > 0, then the term in the rhs of (53) is positive if r > 0.
Therefore, if r > 0 we have @vA@hA < 0.
To study the case that r < 0; we consider the limit behavior of the lhs of (53) as r !  1.
Making use of the limits (52) we obtain
lim
r! 1

@G
@hA
+
@G
@vF
@t
@hA

=  lim
r! 1 r =  1:
That is, there exists pA such that

@G
@hA
+ @G@vF
@t
@hA

< 0 for p < pA, implying that @vA@hA > 0 for p <
pA.
Proof of Lemma 7: Expected equilibrium prots are given by (17). Then, holding constant the
marginal applicant vA and hiring standard vF we have
@
@hi
=
Z

(   wE)(zi(; vi))
@zi
@hi
(zj(; vj))dF ()
=
1
2
p
hi
Z

(   wE)(   hi   h0
hi
vi)(zi(; vi))(zj(; vj))dF (): (54)
Let i = E

jvi; vj  vj

so thatZ

(   i)(zi(; vi))(zj(; vj))dF () = 0:
Then we can write (54) as
@
@hi
=
1
2
p
hi
Z

(   i)2(zi(; vj))(zj(; vj))dF ()
+
1
2
p
hi
(i   wE)(i  
hi   h0
hi
vi)
Z

(zi(; vi))(zj(; vj))dF ():
Let  denote total employment
 = Pr [vA  vA; vF  vF ] =
Z

(zA(; vA))(zF (; vF ))dF ();
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so that
@
@vi
=  Pr vi; vj  vj ;
@
@hi
=
Z

(zi(; vi))
@zi
@hi
(zj(; vj))dF ()
=
1
2
p
hi
Z

(   hi   h0
hi
vi)(zi(; vi))(zj(; vj))dF ()
=
1
2
p
hi
(i  
hi   h0
hi
vi)
Z

(zi(; vi))(zj(; vj))dF ()
=
1
2 (hi + h0)
(i  
hi   h0
hi
vi) Pr

vi; vj  vj

: (55)
Therefore, we can write the direct e¤ect as
@
@hi
=
1
2 (hi + h0)
V ar

jvi; vj  vj

Pr

vi; vj  vj

+ (i   wE)
@
@hi
=
Pr

vi; vj  vj

2 (hi + h0)

V ar

jvi; vj  vj

+ (i   wE)(i  
hi   h0
hi
vi)

:
which gives (54) by noting that @=@vi =  Pr

vi; vj  vj

. Consider now the indirect e¤ect in
(27). The term @@vA is simply the (negative of the) prot made on the marginal hire, which is
@
@vA
=
Z

(   wE)(zA(; vA))
@zA
@hA
(zF (; vF ))dF () =
=  h0 + hAp
hA
Z

(   wE)(zA(; vA))(zF (; vF ))dF ()
=  h0 + hAp
hA
(A   wE)
Z

(zA(; vA))(zF (; vF ))dF ()
=   (A   wE) Pr [vA; vF  vF ]
= (A   wE)
@
@vA
: (56)
Combining (56) and (55) we then obtain (29).
Proof of Proposition 6: We prove the proposition by showing that as hF tends to 1, both
the direct e¤ect @=@hF and the e¤ect on applicants dvA=dhF vanish, but their ratio also tends
to zero. Therefore, the total e¤ect also converges to zero, but its sign is always given by the
sign of  dvA=dhF for su¢ ciently high hF . Therefore, there exists hF ; which is a function of the
parameters of the model, such that the total e¤ect is negative for hF > hF whenever dvA=dhF < 0,
as determined by Proposition 4.
First, we have that
p
hF(zF (; vF )) ! vF () as hF ! 1, where vF () is the Dirac delta
concentrated in vF . Therefore, we can approximate the direct e¤ect for large hF by
@
@hF
 1
2hF
Z

(   wE)2vF () (zA(; vA))dF ():
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In particular,as vF ! wE when the interview becomes perfectly informative we have
lim
hF!1
@
@hF
= lim
hF!1
1
2hF

(   vF )2(zA(; vA))
 j=vF = 0:
Next, consider the indirect e¤ect (27), which we can write using (29) as
@
@vA
dvA
dhF
= (A   wE)

  @
@vA

dvA
dhF
=   (A   wE) Pr [vA; vF  vF ]
dvA
dhF
:
As
lim
hF!1
Pr [vA; vF  vF ] = Pr [vA;   wE ] > 0;
then the limit of the total e¤ect can be written as
lim
hF!1
d
dhF
= lim
hF!1
dvA
dhF

@=@hF
dvA=dhF
+
@
@vA

= lim
hF!1
dvA
dhF

@=@hF
dvA=dhF
  (A   wE) Pr [vA; vF  vF ]

Since for cA > 0 the marginal applicant is valuable to the rm we have that the second term
in the previous expression is bounded away from zero and negative. We next show that the ra-
tio @=@hF =dvA=dhF vanishes as hF ! 1. To do so, we separately approximate @=@hF and
dvA=dhF .
To compute dvA=dhF we use the representation of prots (17). Dene F as
F (vA) =
Z

(   wE)(zA(; vA))(~zF (; vA))dF
with ~zF (; vA) =
p
hF
h
   vA +
q
1
hA+h0
+ 1hF r
i
and r dened in (44): As F is proportional to the
marginal prot made on the marginal hire given the applicants reaction function, the equilibrium
marginal applicant is implicitly dened by
F (vA) = 0:
Then,
dvA
dhF
=  @F=@hF
@F=@vA
;
@F
@hF
=
Z

(   wE)
"
   vA
2
p
hF
+
r
2
p
(hA + h0)(hA + h0 + hF )
#
(zA(; vA))
0(~zF (; vA))dF ();
@F
@vA
=  
Z

(   wE)

hA + h0p
hA
(zA(; vA))(~zF (; vA)) +
p
hF(zA(; vA))
0(~zF (; vA))

dF ():
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Dene xA = vA  
q
1
hA+h0
r. Then hF0(~zF (; vA)) ! 0xA () as hF ! 1, where 0xA () is
the distributional derivative of the Dirac delta concentrated in xA. Then we obtain the following
approximations
@F
@hF

Z

(   wE)
"
(   vA)
2
p
hF
+
r
2
p
(hA + h0)(hA + h0 + hF )
#
(zA(; vA))
1
hF
0xA () dF ()
=
1
hF
p
hF
Z

(   wE)
241
2
(   vA) +
r
2
q
(hA + h0)(
hA+h0
hF
+ 1)
35(zA(; vA))0xA () dF ();
@F
@vA
   1p
hF
Z

(   wE)

hA + h0p
hA
(zA(; vA))xA () + (zA(; vA))
0
xA
()

dF ():
The distribution 0xA () satisesZ

	()0xA () d =  
Z

	0()xA () d =  	0(xA);
for any compactly supported smooth test function. Dene
R() = (   wE)(zA(; vA))f();
S() =
24   vA + rq
(hA + h0)(
hA+h0
hF
+ 1)
35 R()
2
:
From these approximations we readily obtain that
lim
hF!1
hF
p
hF
@F
@hF
=  S0(xA) 6= 0;
lim
hF!1
p
hF
@F
@vA
=  (xA   wE)hA + h0p
hA
(zA(xA; vA)) +R
0(xA) 6= 0:
We can now compute the limit
lim
hF!1
@
@hF
dvA
dhF
= lim
hF!1
 
@
@hF
@F
@vA
@F
@hF
=
 (xA   wE)hA+h0phA (zA(xA; vA)) +R
0(xA)
S0(xA)
lim
hF!1
hF
@
@hF
= 0;
which follows from
lim
hF!1
hF
@
@hF
= lim
hF!1
1
2
Z

(   vF )2vF () (zA(; vA))dF () = 0:

Proof of Proposition 7: We show that whenever the job-seekers precision hA is su¢ ciently low
then both the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect in (27) are negative. First, let tA be such that
whenever cA + w < tA then (i) vA < 0, and (ii) dvA=dhA > 0. That is, the marginal applicant
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is below the average job-seeker, and improvements in recruitment dissuade the marginal applicant
form applying. Proposition 5 (and Proposition 3) ensure that tA exists. By denition of tA; the
indirect e¤ect in (29) is negative. Since vA < 0, then the right hand side of (32) becomes unbounded
as hA ! 0. Therefore, there exists ~hA such that for any hA < ~hA the indirect e¤ect is negative.
Therefore, for cA + w < tA and hA < ~hA the total e¤ect of improved advertising is negative.
Proof of Proposition 8: Suppose that all types vA 2 A apply to the rm, where to meet the
slot constraint we must have Pr [vA 2 A]  K. Facing a slot constraint, the rm will only hire the
applicants with the highest expected match value. As the rms inference (6) is strictly monotone
in the interview score, and Pr [vF ; vA 2 A] is continuous in vF , then the rms hiring rule will again
follow a threshold rule: the rm will set a hiring standard vSF and hire all applicants whose interview
score exceeds vSF , with the hiring standard being given by the binding slot constraint
Pr

vF  vSF ; vA 2 A

= K:
As the rms hiring rule is monotone, job-seekers application decision will also be monotone in
type and satisfying (7). Dene
(vSA; v
S
F ) =
Z 1
 1


zA(; v
S
A)



zF (; v
S
F )

dF ()
with zi(; vSi ) dene by p
hi

   vSi (hi + h0) =hi

; i = A;F:
The function (vSA; v
S
F ) gives the total employment when all applicants with types higher than v
S
A
apply but only those with scores exceeding vSF are hired. Then, for any wage wE , the continuation
equilibrium with slot constraints is given by
T (vSA; v
S
F ) = K (57)
vSF = bA(v
S
A;
cA
wE   w ) (58)
Since
@T
@vSA
=
Z 1
 1
 hA + h0p
hA
 [zA]  [zF ] dF () < 0;
@T
@vSF
=
Z 1
 1
 hF + h0p
hF
 [zF ]  [zA] dF () < 0;
then the slope of the hiring standard in (57) satises dvSF =dv
S
A =   @T@vSA =
@T
@vSF
< 0. This implies
that (57-58) has a unique solution.
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Dene
TA(v
S
A) = T (v
S
A; bA(v
S
A;
cA
wE   w )) =
Z 1
 1


zA(; v
S
A)



~zF (; v
S
A)

dF ()
with
~zF (; v
S
A) =
p
hF

   vSA +
r
1
hA + h0
+
1
hF
 1(p)

:
That is the marginal applicant is implicitly given by TA(vSA) = K: The rms prots are
 =
Z 1
 1
Z 1
vSF (v
S
A)
Z 1
vSA
(   wE) dF (; vA; vF )
and the optimal wage satises the FOC 
 
Z 1
 1
Z 1
vSA
(   wE) dF (; vA; vSF (vSA))
@vSF
@vSA
 
Z 1
 1
Z 1
vSF (v
S
A)
(   wE) dF (; vSA; vF )
!
dvA
dwE
= K:

Proof of Proposition 9: Let p = cAwE w be the equilibrium probability that the marginal applicant
vSA is hired, and dene
TA(v
S
A) = T (v
S
A; bA(v
S
A;
cA
wE   w )) =
Z 1
 1


zA(; v
S
A)



~zF (; v
S
A)

dF ();
with
~zF (; v
S
A) =
p
hF

   vSA +
r
1
hA + h0
+
1
hF
 1(p)

:
From Proposition 8, we have that the equilibrium vSA and v
S
F are implicitly dened by TA(v
S
A) = k
and TF (vSF ) = k.
Since
@TA
@vSA
=
Z 1
 1

 hA + h0p
hA
 [zA]  [~zF ] 
p
hF [zA] [~zF ]

dF () < 0;
@TF
@vSF
=
Z 1
 1

 hF + h0p
hF
 [zF ]  [~zA]  (hA + h0) (hF + h0)
hA
p
hF
 [zF ] [~zA]

dF () < 0;
then the implicit function theorem implies that the sign of @v
S
A
@hi
will be given by the sign of @TA
@vSA
;
while the sign of @v
S
F
@hi
will be given by the sign of @TF
@vSA
. Consider
@TA
@hF
=
Z 1
 1
 
1
2
p
hF
"
   vSA +
s
hF
(hA + h0) (hA + hF + h0)
 1(p)
#
 [zA] [~zF ]
!
dF ()
=
1
2
p
hF
Z 1
 1

   hA + h0
hA + hF + h0
vSA  
hF + h0
hA + hF + h0
vSF

 [zA] [~zF ]

dF ()
=
1
2
p
hF
Z 1
 1
 
   E[jvSF ; vSA]

 [zA] [~zF ]

dF ()
=
1
2
p
hF
 
E[jvSF ; vA  vSA]  E[jvSF ; vSA]
 Z 1
 1
 [zA] [~zF ] dF () > 0
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Therefore, improving the evaluation of applicants unambiguously discourages applications.
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